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Across much of the world the centre-left is in crisis. In Britain, where the 
Labour Party has fared better than most, the left still grapples with how 
to respond to future challenges and is struggling to understand its place 
in a world where class politics has been turned on its head. In the 2017 and 
2018 elections aﬄuent voters turned left, while those hardest hit by years of 
austerity were increasingly willing to turn right.
This fascinating new pamphlet shows how, across the world, decades of neo-
liberalism have left their mark. It tells a story of a movement that more often 
than not has lost its way, searching for answers to the new challenges of 
automation, climate change and identity politics, but lacking a wider sense of 
purpose. The near total control of corporations, extending beyond business to 
the economy, politics and society, has left social democrats who traditionally 
looked to the state for answers searching for new ways to restore power to 
people who increasingly feel its absence. 
It’s no surprise then that in the last decade many social democratic parties 
have found their support squeezed by a new and emerging radical left on the 
one hand, and liberals and conservatives on the other. While in some countries 
short-term tactical decisions have helped to stem the tide, none have escaped 
the waves.
This is the age of anger, where the far right is on the ascendency and growing 
division in society has had major political consequences. In particular the 
cleavage, laid bare by Brexit, between the urban, young liberals and the older, 
working-classes in towns and villages, has created severe challenges for the 
centre-left across the world. Traditionally social democrats have won by 
uniting those groups. But in trying to pick a side, many have lost large sections 
of their traditional support base and some have been virtually wiped out 
altogether. 
Despite the severity of the age, this pamphlet also contains clues to the 
future. While most social democratic parties are still looking backwards for 
answers, clinging to old solutions and arguing over competing versions of the 
past, political pioneers in Denmark and Australia have rejected this approach 
and been rewarded for their courage. The picture painted by the authors is of 
a movement that is at its best when it is open to new ideas and willing to not 
merely acknowledge, but to embrace and confront the diﬃcult questions. 
The importance of a wider social movement is a recurring theme. No political 
party can thrive without reach into the electorate. Like Momentum in 
Britain, many social democratic parties have pioneered new campaigning 
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techniques that have helped to bypass traditional media and speak directly to 
the grassroots. But new techniques have not erased the value of traditional 
structures. Strong trade unions, in particular, are crucial to centre-left 
parties who need roots as well as wings. 
As politics becomes more plural, the social democrats who have had the 
confidence to embrace this new world have fared better than most. In Canada, 
for example, the New Democrats have allied with liberals and greens to gain 
ground at the expense of the right. Similar cross-party co-operation remains 
a rare phenomenon in British politics. The lessons oﬀered here suggest that 
may need to change.
Whichever lessons are drawn from this pamphlet, this is a debate we must 
have. The collapse of neo-liberalism, the rise of angry, polarised politics and a 
growing public discontent has made it clear that ‘the institutions and dogmas 
of a quiet past’, as Abraham Lincoln put it, ‘are unfit for the stormy present’. 
The future is up for grabs but only to those who are willing to question, listen, 
think and pioneer. In recent years, as global crises have left us buﬀeted, 
politics has felt increasingly small and parochial. This pamphlet seeks to reach 
out across national boundaries, drawing on our international traditions in 
order to seek the inspiration for change, from wherever it is best learnt.
It could not come at a better time.
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To say the social democracy is in crisis is now glib beyond words. We all know 
it because we see it and taste it. The crisis has a long tale. The 2008 crash, 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the election of Thatcher in 1979, the second 
oil crisis the same year and in the UK Jim Callaghan announcing to the Labour 
conference in 1976 that you cannot spend your way out of recession! But we 
can go back further and recognize that when in 1978 Eric Hobsbawm wrote 
his prophetic essay ‘Forward march of Labour Halted’, he was not saying that 
the march had halted then but had halted in the late 1940s when the size of 
the working class stopped growing and started to shrink. So just at the high 
point of British social democracy and the creation of the post-war settlement 
on terms dictated as much by labour as by capital, the seeds of the crisis were 
being sown. 
If it has been a long time coming, then in part that is because of the success of 
social democrats and the hold we had on the popular imagination. Homes fit 
for heroes, health free at the point of need, social security, full employment, 
peace – these were huge victories. But slowly, bit by bit the foundations of 
that settlement and of social democracy itself were chipped away: the end 
of deference, the rise of individualism, the consumer society and now a form 
of turbo-consumption, combined with financialisation, globalisation and the 
concomitant tensions over nation, identity and place. Social democracy was 
grounded in the solidarity and relative stability of the second half of the 
twentieth century and now it struggles badly in the upheaval caused by the Big 
Bang, capital flows, mass migration and digitisation. 
Like the boiling frog, few social democratic parties knew what was happening. 
Sure they slipped in the polls but the good times would come back? But decline 
continued as social democrats either worked with the grain of neo-liberalism 
or failed to carve out a suﬃciently diﬀerent space. Decline eventually led to 
collapse as parties began to melt down with an electorate who, post 2008, felt 
the social democrats had little to say and even less to oﬀer. PASOK in Greece 
went first, followed eventually by the Dutch and the French. The German SPD 
has floundered and even the once hegemonic Swedish Social Democratic Party 
stares at defeat at the hands not of centrists who would prolong the main 
tenants of the social and democratic project but of a much harder right – the 
radical-right Sweden Democrats. 
Of course not everything is doom and gloom. As you pick your way through 
the essays that follow you will see that the Australians are bouncing back, 
that Jeremy Corbyn is bucking the trend in the UK in opposition as are 
some Democrats in the USA and that in Portugal a centre-left coalition led 
Introduction: the crisis of social 
democracy and the road to renewal
By Neal Lawson and Adrian Pabst
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by social democrats is balancing the books, fighting austerity and pushing 
ahead in the polls. Are these exceptions to the rule or the start of a diﬀerent 
social democracy to come? The truth is we do not yet know. Like Zhou 
Enlai’s rumoured take in 1972 on the French Revolution, ‘it’s too early to 
tell’. But even if they continue to buck the trend, there is little that can yet 
be discerned as a new governing philosophy for social democracy, let alone a 
sense of shared project across these parties and countries which used to set 
the terms of national and global debate. 
We come at the crisis as two authors and editors with diﬀerent perspectives 
but a belief that any feasible and desirable response will not be owned by 
any one bit of the social democratic family. The challenges are too big and 
too complex for any leader or group to see all, let alone fix all. Instead, it will 
take a diversity of views and a spirit of profound collaboration nationally and 
internationally if the social democratic project is to be resurrected. It will also 
take ambition, courage and perseverance.
Adrian thinks that social democracy lost its way when it failed to renew itself 
and oﬀer a vision of national renewal anchored in people’s everyday existence. 
First the New Left from the mid-1960s onwards took social-democratic 
politics in a doctrinaire direction that was abstract and soulless. It equated 
the purpose of the left not so much with the struggle for greater economic 
justice but primarily with cultural liberation. Henceforth social democrats 
preferred progress to tradition, identity to class and free choice to common 
endeavour. In power, the democratic left sought to articulate an ethical vision, 
but successive social-democratic governments were much more committed to 
modernisation and liberalisation than to the common good. Social democracy 
became increasingly technocratic and transactional, focused on fiscal 
transfers and the extension of individual entitlements rather than national 
renewal around mutual obligations. The lack of an animating purpose and a 
clear defence of the labour interest explain in part why the left bequeathed 
economic crises in 1976 and 2008 that the right exploited to usher in a new 
political settlement. Can social democracy oﬀer a renewed unifying philosophy 
that reflects people’s experience and hopes?
Neal thinks that the crisis is rooted in the technological foundations of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the moment that gave life to 
social democracy. It was the era of the factory and the social and cultural 
machine driven century it spawned – from a rising and self-Waware working 
class to a system of big government that could fight wars, direct much of the 
economy and build a social infrastructure from the top down and the centre 
precisely because the factory or Fordist model allowed it. In this era the gap 
between the social democrat and the technocrat was wafer thin. But the shift 
to post-Fordism, a more deregulated economy and eventually financialisation 
and globalisation put paid to both the governing method of social democrats 
and the solidaristic culture which glued it together. In a world dominated 
by a culture more akin to Facebook than the factory, can social democracy, 
however you perceive it, be done in a world of globalized networks? 
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Whatever our diﬀering analysis we share a desire to listen and learn from each 
other and many others. We share a belief that left to itself capital commodifies 
land and labour in ways that fail the test of the common good. And more than 
anything we share a belief in the capacity of people to organize themselves and 
the society they live in – by doing it together. In this it is not the people who 
must change but we the social democrats. Instead of being the technocrats 
and deliverers of a new good society – we must be the servants of those 
citizens and that society. Our task is not to direct, order and command the 
state and through it the citizens and the civil society but to serve them – to 
resource, legitimize and give permission to their best instincts and practices. 
Both the New Left and the New Right did just the opposite. The following 
quote by Margaret Thatcher in 1981 sums up a lot of what is wrong with 
the politics of the last forty years or so: “it isn’t that I set out on economic 
policies; it’s that I set out really to change the approach, and changing 
the economics is the means of changing that approach. If you change the 
approach, you really are after the heart and soul of the nation. Economics 
are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul”. Social democrats 
win people’s trust and vote when they reflect popular hopes and qualities of 
character that are woven into the fabric of national culture.
Social democracy faces an existential crisis because it has failed to protect 
and represent the people it was set up for – especially the working class. 
Today the democratic left either stands primarily for the more aﬄuent, 
secular, metropolitan elites as well as public sector workers and certain 
ethnic minorities, or else it amounts to little more a protest march made up of 
sectional interests and vocal pressure groups. Social democrats have become 
more homogeneous in terms of their cultural values and less representative of 
countries as a whole.
By contrast, in the past the democratic left built broad cross-cultural and 
cross-class coalitions around shared interests and values. In the social, 
cultural and economic cauldron that made social democrats and social 
democracy in the later decades of the late nineteenth century, there was an 
incredible outpouring of new civic, economic, social and political associations 
– cooperatives, mutuals, friendly societies, book clubs, the Clarion cycle clubs, 
new trade unions and much more. People made the good society in their here 
and now. In the gaps between the emerging big state and the free market they 
created spaces in which they could be fully human, where relationships, care 
and empathy were stronger than profit or the professional who knew best.  
That possibility of that moment was lost as the big state swept all before it 
and then the unfettered global market. 
Both the big state model of the post-war era and the free market model 
since the late 1970s have broken down. These two models were modernising 
projects that viewed state and market as the key institutions to govern 
society. Whereas the first model focused on the administrative state to 
control from the top down previously more mutual arrangements, the second 
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model shifted the emphasis to the free market as the main mode of social 
organisation. Both provided greater individual freedoms and opportunities, 
but they also had the eﬀect of disembedding politics and the economy from 
society and subordinating social ties to power and money.
Today we face a situation when the big state and the free market have again 
both been found wanting – and in the gaps and the spaces people find new 
ways to associate, to govern, to provide, to buy, sell, to care and express as 
much as possible of their full humanity. 
It is in this space that the rich soil of a new politics can take root. It is here 
that people can find shelter from a state which can be fair but ineﬀective and a 
market which can be eﬃcient but cruel. It is here that people are prefiguring a 
better world and the only question is whether it can accelerated, joined up and 
scaled up to become not just a few creative experiments – but the basis for a 
new society. 
The purpose of social democracy is to democratise the workplace, the 
community and the country by giving the labour and other interests 
participation in the governance of institutions and making them accountable 
to the people. Institutions such as schools, hospitals, railways, water 
companies, post oﬃces and housing associations generate a sense of 
connection and loyalty. Insofar as they serve people’s needs and interests, they 
are a good in their lives and a source of social bonds and collective action. A 
social-democratic politics has to be based on values of aﬀection, attachment 
and association.
And the issue is not just whether social democrats have it in them to 
transform their politics but whether they can do so in ways that defeats 
the rise of an ever more populist radical right and hard left in an age where 
technology provides as many solutions as it poses threats. 
Just as people do, social democrats need to carry with us the spirit of the 
past, the present and the future, of communitarians and cosmopolitans, the 
cities and the towns. This will be a tense and bumpy journey – but it is a road 
that has been taken before. The industrial working class did find common 
ground with the liberal intelligentsia and the middle classes. It took verve, 
ambition and perseverance to do it before and it will need such skills again. 
One way to build bridges between various groups is to focus on capitalism 
– the broken economic model and the growing popular demand for greater 
justice in the economy. The alternative to the liberal centre-right or the 
radical libertarian right is to combine a critique of capitalism with a defence of 
the market economy and ‘the commons’ – all the common resources, including 
open-source technology that should be available to all. Connected with this 
is the case to break up monopolies (industrial, financial and tech), introduce 
the ‘living wage’ across the economy, give workers participation in corporate 
governance and strengthen democratically self-governed institutions 
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(including professional associations and trade unions in the services sector). 
All this has to be part of a new social-democratic political economy.
Another way of building a broad cross-class and cross-cultural coalition is 
to respond to the popular desire for greater social solidarity, which cuts 
across the deepening divisions along fault-lines of age, class, geography and 
educational attainment. Individualism is rampant and nationalism resurgent, 
but a sizeable majority of people believe in ‘common decency’ (George Orwell), 
freedom, fairness, and the relationships of family, community and country. All 
these values rest on lived solidarity – relationships of ‘give-and-receive’ that 
involve a sense of mutual duties.
Around the globe we see social democrats coming to terms, finally, to what is 
nothing less than an existential crisis. Nothing about that crisis is ordained, 
given or determined. We only ever made history in conditions not of our 
choosing. So it will be again. 
SWEDEN
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SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ARE STILL SWEDEN’S LARGEST PARTY
After the Swedish election on 9 September 2018 the question of who will rule 
Sweden is highly uncertain. The Social Democrats’ share of the vote fell from 
31 percent in 2014 to 28.3 percent in 2018 but this figure was higher than 
that forecast in the public opinion polls carried out during the actual election 
campaign. The Social Democrats are the largest party by a considerable 
margin and lead the largest block. However, the centre-right parties are 
now making a bid for power. The whole situation is further complicated by 
the increase in support for the Sweden Democrats in every election since 
2006. Sweden has a new political landscape and faces a period of political 
uncertainty.
 
POLITICS AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT
In Sweden the Social Democrats have been in power since 2014 in coalition 
with the Green Party. Now, however, the country and the Swedish political 
landscape stands at a crossroads. In September 2018 Sweden went to the 
polls and the outcome of the election hardly provided a clear mandate for a 
Social Democratic and progressive political programme.
 
1. SWEDEN
By Håkan A. Bengtsson
Already in 2014, the four non-socialist parties – the Moderates 
(conservatives), Centre (new liberal; formerly the farmers party), the Liberals 
(formerly the Peoples’ Party) and KD (Christian Democrats) who formed the 
coalition government prior to the election in 2014 – lost ground while the “red/
green” parties (Social Democrats, the Left, and the Green party) either made 
marginal gains or losses. However, the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats 
made substantial gains in both the 2014 and the 2018 election. It is also worth 
noting that the Feminist Initiative achieved 3.12 percent of the vote but failed 
to achieve the necessary 4 percent required for admission to Parliament.
Source: Official election result
Although the outcome of the 2014 election was by no means a success it 
was still possible for Stefan Löfven to form a government lead by the Social 
Democrats. The party chose to form a coalition with the Green Party and 
decided to exclude the Left. Prior to the 2010 election all three parties 
campaigned on what was essentially a common platform, but as a result the 
Social Democrats lost five percent of its electoral support in the 2014 election.
Although the Red/Green parties achieved a larger share of the popular vote 
than the non-socialist block in the 2014 election, they did not command an 
overall majority. This was due to the emergence of a third block in Swedish 
politics with the Sweden Democrats taking their place in the Swedish 
parliament for the first time. So far, no party has been willing to negotiate with 
the Sweden Democrats and neither block is prepared to form a government 
dependant on their support. There has, however, been much discussion 
and disagreement within the non-socialist block, with two of the parties 
(the Moderates and the Christian Democrats) indicating that they might be 
prepared to do so after the next election while the other two (the Liberals and 
the Centre) having so far rejected the possibility.
In 2014 the Social Democrats formed the government with the support of the 
largest block in the Parliament, but they still lacked a majority. Sweden has a 
long tradition of minority governments and such a situation is not considered 
unfavourably by the Parliament. It has enabled the formation of governments 
which have reflected the system of proportional representation but has also 
provided the scope for negotiations between parties which are not within 
the government thus enabling them to exert a degree of influence despite 
being in opposition. But in 2014 the situation was diﬀerent. The emergence 
of a large right-wing populist party, which no other part has so far chosen to 
cooperate with or even to negotiate with, made it more diﬃcult for a minority 
government to rule eﬀectively which is exactly what this social democratically 
lead government has encountered.
According to the rules for parliamentary voting procedure, the budget 
of a minority government can be passed if the bill has the support of the 
majority of members of parliament. However, since the budget enacted by 
the non-socialist parties in the autumn of 2014 was supported by the Social 
Democrats, the latter were forced to work with a non-socialist budget for 
most of 2015. Subsequently the governments’ budgets were approved. The 
Social Democratic government succeeded in imposing taxes and charges 
thanks to the support of Green Party and the Left, which was not included 
in the government. In other respects, it proved more problematic. The 
Social Democratic government therefore refrained from tabling several bills 
which would not have been passed. The government succeeded in achieving 
compromises with non-socialist parties on certain political issues. In a number 
of cases, agreement was reached on a broad cross-party front. In other 
cases, one of the non-socialist parties or the Sweden Democrats supported a 
government bill. The government has on occasion tabled bills which have been 
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defeated in order to emphasise ideological diﬀerences. But on the whole, the 
scope for conducting a more ambitious social democratic political programme 
has been extremely limited. The Sweden Democrats are a right-wing populist 
party with roots in right-wing radicalism but currently describes itself as 
social-conservative. In recent years, however, it has espoused traditional non-
socialist positions with regard, for example, to welfare and taxation.  
This graph shows how support for the Social Democrats among voters has 
developed over the past ninety years:
The Social Democrats were the party of government from 1932 to 1976 – a 
period of 44 years. This includes brief periods when the country was lead by 
national and coalition governments. The historically dominant position which 
the Social Democrats have enjoyed in Sweden is reflected in the election 
results. From the 40’s to the 60’s the average was more than 45 per cent. 
It was marginally lower during 70’s and 80’s but still over 40 percent. Since 
2010, however, the party has so far polled slightly over 30 percent. (Public 
opinion polls indicate that this downward trend will continue in the 2018 
election). Discussions within the labour movement relating to this decline in 
electoral support have been going on for some considerable time. As early 
as the 1970s – and, in particular, since the defeat in the election of 1976 – 
long-term defection among the electorate has been analysed. This decline 
has been attributed to structural changes in the economy, the industrial 
working class having reached its numerical peak during the 1960s, a change 
in class consciousness, identity and individuality, and not least structural 
transformation and urbanisation. A critical factor has been the decline in 
population and employment in small and middle-sized industrial towns where 
the labour movement was powerful and exercised a dominant influence on the 
local community. The party has failed to achieve the same dominant status 
and influence in the growing urban areas. 
Source: Compilation by Håkan A Bengtsson. The columns show the Social Democratic 
election results in dual chamber and single chamber (post 1970) as an average per decade.
Source: Compilation by Håkan A Bengtsson. The election results are shown as an average 
for each decade. All left-of-centre parties – including the Green Party – are included in the 
red columns. All non-socialist parties including the Sweden Democrats constitute the blue 
columns. The results relate to both two-chamber and single chamber elections.
Source: Compilation by Håkan A Bengtsson. The red and blue blocks in the last six elections.
Social democracy has undoubtedly had an extremely strong position in 
Sweden. Social democracy and the left won the battle of the twentieth 
century. During the 2010s a paradigm shift has occurred which has changed 
this scenario:
The compilation clearly illustrates that the left was much more successful 
in Sweden than the non-socialist parties during most of the twentieth 
century with the exception of the 1970s when the latter held the advantage, 
culminating in their victory in the 1976 election which brought to an end 44 
years of social democratic rule. It shows equally clearly that the balance 
of power between left and right has changed radically since the turn of 
the century. This trend is further emphasised if the results of the last six 
parliamentary elections are shown side by side:
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THE ELECTION RESULT 2018
In principle the result of the election has not changed the balance of power. 
The red/green parties are still bigger than the centre-right coalition, although 
the margin is smaller than previously (now by only a single seat). However, 
what is most significant is that the Sweden Democrats have increased their 
share of the vote and strengthened their position, taking 17.5 percent. This is 
remarkable since the party only gained entry into Parliament for the first time 
in 2010. This further complicates the conditions for future governments and 
could potentially redraw the political map. 
Although the Social Democratic share of the vote fell from 31 to 28.3 percent, 
the result of the election is considered something of a success. Compared with 
developments in many other European countries, despite this apparent decline 
in support, the Social Democrats have maintained a strong position and are 
by a considerable margin still the largest party. It must be remembered that 
the Social Democrats have been in power for four problematic and turbulent 
years. Furthermore, these electoral losses were not nearly as great as had 
been feared and certain opinion polls had predicted. During the months leading 
up to the election some polls indicated that the Social Democrats would get as 
little as 22 percent while the average rating on election day forecast between 
24-26 percent. Taking this into account, the actual result of over 28 percent 
should be see as surprisingly good. This appeared to be the result of the 
mobilisation of support and a shift in opinion in the later stages of the election 
campaign. The Social Democrats remained, as a result, easily the largest party 
for members of the blue-collar trade union LO despite considerable support 
for the Sweden Democrats among its members.
The Social Democratic election strategy must be viewed against a background 
of the diﬃculties experienced by the left in many countries around the world. 
The strategy focused on tougher measures against crime, a restrictive 
immigration policy and increased funding for welfare. At the start of the 
election campaign many social democratic activists were critical of the Party’s 
increasingly restrictive approach to immigration. There were a number of 
notable defections from the Party for this reason. After this crisis the focus 
shifted to welfare issues – which had been the intention from the start.
The Social Democrats gave a number of undertakings regarding improvements 
in welfare, for example increases in pensions and an extra weeks’ holiday for 
families with children. Just before the election they proposed an increase 
in taxation on capital. It is still too early to say with any certainty what 
accounted for the Social Democratic recovery, suﬃcient to say at this stage 
that the result of the election was surprisingly favourable despite the decline 
in support among the electorate.
The Left Party increased its share of the vote by over two percent compared 
with the previous election to 8 percent. Many observers expected that 
the Left Party, which was not formally part of the ruling coalition but gave 
its support for the budgets, would do better. The Green Party which had 
occupied ministerial posts for the first time declined to 4.4 percent and is now 
the smallest party in the Parliament. It is common for smaller parties which 
participate in coalitions to be punished by voters. The impression is that the 
Party has made too many compromises on key issues, not least its acceptance 
of the change in immigration policy while still remaining in the government. 
The environment, which is the Party’s core issue, was high on the agenda 
during a summer which saw a heatwave and extensive forest fires in its train 
and this may have kept the Party above the 4 percent required for entry 
into Parliament. Together the red/green parties are still the largest block in 
Parliament – if only by the smallest of margins. The diﬀerence between the 
traditional left and right of centre blocks after the election is a single seat.  
The four centre-right parties headed by the Moderate Party (Conservative) 
leader Ulf Kristersson are demanding the prime ministership. A controversial 
issue for the centre-right parties is their relationship with the Sweden 
Democrats. So far, all parties have kept their distance from both cooperation 
and dialogue. The question is what will happen next. Two of the parties in the 
Alliance (the Moderates and the Christian Democrats) have indicated their 
willingness for dialogue without actually doing so. The Liberals and the Centre 
Party have rejected outright the prospect of a government dependant on 
support from the SD. At the same time there has been talk of cross-party 
cooperation but the conflict between right and left has become sharper in this 
election. The Parties have hardened their positions and the common ground at 
the centre of Swedish politics appears to be largely abandoned. 
WHAT’S LEFT?22 SWEDEN 23
THE RISE OF THE SWEDEN DEMOCRATS AND THE
DIFFICULTIES IN FORMING A GOVERNMENT
In a relatively short time the Sweden Democrats have become a party 
with considerable support among the electorate. It is a party with roots 
in extremism and fascism but for some time it has sought to imitate other 
European right-wing populist parties and movements. The Party describes 
itself as “socially conservative” but, in reality, positions itself closer to other 
illiberal parties and movements such as that led by Orban in Hungary. SD has 
grown in successive elections to reach its present 17.5 percent of electoral 
support. For the third parliamentary term in succession the party has held 
the balance of power but is now stronger than ever. The SD aims to be 
obstructive and votes against any government which refuses to listen to or 
cooperate with it. So far, all parties have refused to accommodate them. It is 
this which creates such uncertainty regarding the future and who will form a 
government.
It is still too early to predict who will form the government after the election. 
It could take several weeks or even months of uncertainty. In the short term 
the four centre-right parties and the SD have announced that they will vote 
the Social Democrat leader Stefan Löfven out of oﬃce as prime minister.  In 
all probability, the next in line will be the Moderate Party leader but whether 
his candidacy will be accepted by the Parliament is less certain, particularly as 
this will depend on what SD will do. Whoever assumes the premiership must 
have the capability to ensure that future budgets are approved, conduct a 
viable economic policy and govern the country eﬀectively.
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS’ NARRATIVE AND STRATEGY
The classical narrative of Swedish social democracy centres on the notion of 
‘Folkhemmet’ – the Peoples’ Home – a concept first introduced in the 1920s 
by Per Albin Hansson. This was actually a reformulation of what was originally 
a conservative political expression. Folkhemmet became a metaphor for 
the Swedish Model as an alternative to unbridled capitalism and communist 
dictatorship. As early as 1936 the publication of the American journalist 
Marquis Childs’ book Sweden: the Middle Way established an international 
awareness of Sweden as an ideal. Folkhemmet is inextricably linked with the 
creation and development of the Swedish Welfare model but is also connected 
with public institutions and regulatory agencies, which have implanted the 
market into society both through collective agreements and collective 
insurance models under civil and/or oﬃcial auspices.
The notion of Folkhemmet is not so appealing in today’s political arena because 
it was essentially a national phenomenon. In today’s global perspective it is no 
longer self-evident primarily because two decades of market liberalism have 
transformed the national political landscape. The financial crisis of the 1990s 
transformed views on economic policy, establishing a more conservative and 
cautious approach to financial policy and public spending. This applied to both 
the Social Democrats and the non-socialist parties. This view was most aptly 
expressed by the then party leader Göran Persson: “Those in debt are not 
free”. After three years in opposition the Social Democrats returned to power 
in 1994. The challenge was to put the economy on a sound footing. The party 
succeeded in doing that, which accounts in large part for its rule over the past 
twelve years. 
Eﬀective control of the state’s finances became a social democratic mantra. 
Today it has become a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the party proved 
that the welfare state could be saved, which was by no means certain when 
Sweden was in crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. The essential features of 
the welfare state have survived. But on the other hand, the party was forced 
to enact substantial cuts in public spending. The overall tax burden has been 
reduced by both the Social Democrat and the non-socialist governments – 
from what was, admittedly, a high level. Since the crisis in the 1990s, Sweden 
has experienced a period of steady increases in real pay that has fuelled an 
enormous increase in private consumption. Public spending has not increased 
at the same rate, which has aﬀected many areas of the public sector. Social 
Democracy has to a high degree maintained its adherence to cautious and 
restrictive economic policies long after the end of the 1990s. What took place 
then can be aptly described as a politico-economic paradigm shift, in line with 
the economic dogma that dominates the EU and Eurozone projects.
There are many more private entrepreneurs in today’s public sector than 
previously. This applies to almost all sectors within the welfare system, 
even core areas such as healthcare, schools and caring (pre-school and 
elderly). This is still financed primarily through direct taxation. However, the 
combination of freedom of choice, market models and, in certain sectors, a 
voucher system have transformed the way in which Swedish welfare functions. 
Many of these changes have been introduced by non-socialist governments. In 
general, it has been Social Democratic policy to decentralise from the state 
to the municipalities and to empower the individual citizen, but the party 
has preferred to favour non-profit organisations such as cooperatives and 
charities. In reality, however, there has been an enormous increase in privately 
owned operators who have made huge profits in the public sector. 
Social Democratic governments have done nothing to replace or reform these 
models when this might have been feasible and in more recent times they have 
not had the necessary majority. This has resulted in much debate and conflict 
within the party between those who accept the current situation and those 
who urge a return to a more traditional welfare system. The party has been 
increasingly critical of private businesses in the public sector and in mid-2018 
it tabled a bill aimed at limiting profits made by private interests operating 
in publicly owned enterprises. This bill is however doomed to failure since 
all the non-socialist parties and the Sweden Democrats will vote against it. 
Nonetheless it indicates that today the Social Democrats are more critical of 
privately provided welfare than previously. It has once again become an issue 
that divides the political blocks.
WHAT’S LEFT?24 SWEDEN 25
A social democratic slogan proclaims that “the Swedish Model must be 
expanded not disbanded”. The Social Democrats are still the party with the 
highest level of trust among voters when it comes to welfare. When issues 
relating to health care and welfare dominate the pre-election debate this 
favours the Social Democrats.
But the slogan regarding the expanding of the Swedish Model rather than 
disbanding it is equally applicable to the challenges facing the Swedish labour 
market model. The Social Democrats and the Swedish Confederation of Trade 
Unions (LO) often speak of a “well-ordered” labour market. The Swedish and 
Nordic labour market models featuring comprehensive collective agreements/
bargaining and what are still powerful trade unions are today under siege. For 
example, the collective agreements guarantee maximum and minimum pay 
levels resulting in relatively small pay diﬀerentials, even if these have increased 
over the last two decades. However, in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the Swedish model has ensured that even those with the lowest 
incomes have benefitted from pay increases. That has not prevented those 
with the highest incomes from increasing the earnings gap primarily through 
income from savings, the stock market and real estate.
It may be said that, in general, the strategy adopted by the Social Democrats 
is to focus on defending and to some degree renewing the Swedish Welfare 
model. The scope for more ambitious future scenarios has been strictly 
limited during recent decades. In purely economic terms this would have been 
feasible. The Swedish economy has performed well during this period and 
recovered relatively quickly from the financial crisis of 2008. A high level of 
growth has continued and employment increased, as newly arrived immigrants 
are finding employment more quickly than previously. However, unemployment 
is around 6.5 per cent which will mean that, in all probability, the Social 
Democrats will not achieve their stated goal of the lowest unemployment in 
the EU by 2020. 
Nonetheless the state finances are in good shape. The national debt is at 
its lowest level ever. Many Social Democrats favour greater investment in 
welfare, infrastructure and sustainability, particularly now when interest 
rates are low. Fiscal conservatism is still very much alive despite the Social 
Democrats having the resources to boost public spending on the back of 
the increased revenue generated by the favourable economic development. 
There is widespread dissatisfaction at the shortcomings in the welfare 
system, particularly in areas seeing reductions in population and employment 
opportunities.  
A catalyst for dissatisfaction has also been the level of immigration in Sweden 
which has been considerable for some time.  During the 2015 refugee crisis, 
Sweden was the country thst, per capita, accepted most of those applying for 
asylum. This was probably due to Sweden’s liberal immigration policy. However, 
Sweden was forced to change tack when faced with the huge influx of refugees 
in the autumn of 2015. Thanks to stricter application of the regulations and 
tighter border controls, the number of those seeking asylum has decreased 
drastically. This has caused considerable tensions and divisions within the red/
green coalition government, with opposition coming mostly from the Green 
Party but also many Social Democrats. Against this background the Sweden 
Democrats have been gaining ground for some considerable time, and it 
appears that the sequence of events since 2015 provide further reasons for 
voters to switch to the right-wing populist party. 
A fundamental change appears to have taken place regarding the importance 
voters attach to diﬀerent issues. Normally, the economy, employment and 
welfare are high on the list of priorities. Now these have been replaced by 
immigration as well as law and order. These are often interlinked in the minds 
of the voters. The terrorist attack in central Stockholm also influenced the 
political climate.
The Social Democratic pre-election strategy aims to highlight these issues. 
According to the architects of the Party’s strategy, the mistakes made by 
the progressive political elites, which resulted in the Brexit and Trump votes, 
and the strategies of other Social Democratic parties must not be repeated. 
In the run-up to the election of 2018 the Party adopted the word “security” 
as its overall theme relating not only to a more restrictive immigration policy 
and more police to maintain law and order but also security in the welfare 
system – with more substantial allocation of resources to welfare, social care 
and schools. The aim was to stem the flow of voters to the right-wing parties 
by promising eﬀective measures to deal with immigration and crime. Several 
parties chose a more restrictive course on immigration, in order to emphasise 
their undertakings on welfare policy, primarily in the later stages of the 
election campaign.
The choice of strategy gave rise to considerable dissatisfaction among those 
Social Democratic Party members who preferred a more liberal approach 
to immigration policy. This resulted in widely reported defections of elected 
Social Democratic politicians. Several Social Democratic aﬃliates protested.
PARTY ORGANISATION
Sweden has been a country with very strong popular movements and strong 
political parties. The Social Democratic Party has had close aﬃliations with a 
number of popular movements which were dominated by, had close ties to and 
were led by Social Democrats. It would not be inaccurate to speak of a social 
democratic environment of popular movements woven into many aspects of 
everyday life and the country’s political fabric. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Party had 1.2 million members. Many of 
these had collective membership through their trade union. Enrolment took 
place locally where the local trade union branch made the decisions. This 
eﬀectively created local branches of the Social Democratic Party and played a 
major role in election campaigns, facilitating the mobilisation of members and 
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voters. Collective enrolment was abolished in 1990-91, which entailed a drastic 
reduction in party membership. There has also been a gradual decline in the 
number of individual members. For a number of years, the figure hovered 
around 100,000. The Party being in government has meant that membership 
has decreased further with the latest statistics putting the figure at around 
89,000. Normally membership tends to increase during an election campaign. 
It remains to be seen what will happen in 2018 but bearing in mind the political 
climate there is every reason to believe that membership is more likely to 
decline further.
Against this general background there are regional diﬀerences. The Social 
Democrats have always done better in areas where there is a strong tradition 
of popular movements, and that has been reflected in election results. In 
recent years, the Party has made considerable eﬀorts to recruit and involve 
more new members, in order to revitalise the popular movement element 
in the party organisation. Political programmes focusing on the popular 
movements are produced at regular intervals.
It is obvious, however, that the age of the old mass parties is over. All Swedish 
parties and popular movements have fewer members than previously. On the 
other hand, many of these erstwhile members were not particularly active 
if they ever actually attended meetings. It was claimed previously that the 
parties were a thing of the past. During more recent years, membership has 
tended to stabilise. However, there are a number of aﬃliated organisations: 
student associations, youth associations, the religious organisation “Faith and 
Solidarity”, The Women’s Association (S-Kvinnor), and LGBT Social Democrats, 
who are represented on the Board of the Party (comparable to the UK Labour 
Party’s National Executive Committee).
Although collective membership no longer applies, there remains the trade 
union/political cooperation between the Party and the Confederation of 
Swedish Trade Unions (LO) with its constituent federations. LO conducts its 
own campaign to encourage members to go and vote – and to vote for the 
Social Democrats. Some federations are more enthusiastic than others. There 
is a shared history and there are many oﬃcials who come from a blue-collar 
CRITICAL ISSUES FOR THE PARTY
Critical issues for the Social Democrats in the run up to this year’s election 
are as follows:
• Better Welfare
It should be added that schools and healthcare have been given particular 
emphasis as critical political issues.
• Law and order
• More rapid integration
Although the performance of the Swedish economy is much better than many 
other countries there is considerable debate as to how radical the demands 
the party can and should make.
Although the Party has chosen to take clearer and more ambitious initiatives, 
it often fails to provide an adequate description of their purpose. They are 
often lost in a cloud of activities and ultimately fail to provide any electoral 
advantage. The Party has displayed an increasing readiness to criticise the 
activities of private operators and market models within the public sector. 
The debate as to whether the Party should take a clearer position regarding 
profit interest in the welfare sector still rages on. The Party is also urged to 
invest more to reduce unemployment and boost public spending. However, the 
party has approved many of these companies. Despite a high rate of growth 
over several years and increased employment, unemployment remains high. 
A more adventurous political programme and a less stringent financial policy 
with increased public spending would in the opinion of many commentators 
bring unemployment down further. 
One example is housing. Sweden has a growing population not least due to 
immigration and rapid urbanisation. This means that there is a shortage 
of housing, particularly in cities and large towns. In recent years, housing 
construction has increased in response to high demand, but is now declining 
due to the government’s imposition of stricter borrowing requirements. This 
could result in the stagnation of the economy and a growing gap in social 
housing. The social housing policy, which provided publicly subsidised lending 
for housing construction, was abandoned during crises of the 1990s. The 
eﬀects are now being felt. An increase in housing construction would lead to a 
more favourable economic development and also boost employment. 
Sweden’s Social Democrats do not only need a story. They need to link their 
policies to politico-economic solutions within critical societal and global areas.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ISSUES
Sweden is a country that has shown itself to be favourable to international 
cooperation, within the United Nations, other international forums and in the 
EU. The country stands for transparency and is generally in favour of free 
trade, and that applies for the trade union and labour movement as a whole 
where protectionism has never gained.
But there are important issues relating to international cooperation that need 
urgent consideration, not least those relating to social democratic parties in 
other countries. How can the global labour market be developed to ensure 
the prevalence of acceptable social standards? How can we create procedures 
for mobility that do not lead to low wage competition? Posted companies and 
workers have become critical issues in many industries. Today this means 
that the Swedish collective bargaining model is undermined and puts pressure 
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on those with the lowest pay. Companies that follow the Swedish collective 
agreements cannot compete on the Swedish market. The internal market 
must be reformed. Sweden has called for a review of the directive regulating 
the posting of workers and has been a driving force for the EU’ Social Pillar. 
But there is still much to do. The need for cooperation and consensus 
regarding refugee policy should also be emphasised. Sweden assumed a great 
deal of responsibility for refugees in 2015, which led to a reappraisal of the 
country’s refugee policy. The countries of Europe must reach agreement 
regarding common rules and take more responsibility than that reflected in 
today’s restrictive manoeuvring. The “short straw” policy dominating refugee 
policy damages Europe’s solidarity and undermines the European project.
Opinions on the EU revolve more generally around the crucial problem 
of finding a balance between what should be handled nationally and what 
internationally. The basis must be the principle of subsidiarity. However, some 
Social Democrats maintain that, with the internal market as supra-ideology, 
aided and abetted by the Europeam Commission and the Court of Justice, the 
EU has hampered policy-making and undermined democracy. These conflicting 
opinions must be resolved by the various European Social Democratic parties 
together with the aim of creating a consensus.
The quest for economic policies that will successfully create progressive 
values and ideals in the future constitutes another critical challenge. The 
best forum for such a project is through an international exchange of ideas. 
The challenge is how to formulate a progressive politico-economic approach 
that can ensure the development of the welfare state and its realisation in a 
globalised world.
The international exchange between members and citizens within the EU must 
also be developed. Courses and educational initiatives should be arranged 
for members and activists at a European level. Free interrail cards should be 
provided for young people. So far European cooperation has only taken place 
at too high a level.
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CRISIS TO RENAISSANCE?
From a European perspective, the Social Democratic result in the 2018 
Swedish election is a positive signal. In several elections in recent years social 
democratic/progressive/socialist parties have seen their electoral support 
decline and, in some cases, significantly weakened. With that in mind the 
Swedish election could indicate that there is light at the end of the tunnel. 
The recovery achieved in the last stages of the election by focusing on welfare 
reforms and a fairer distribution of wealth could be the first signs
of a recovery.
That is not to say that the Party does not face enormous challenges. The 
decline in support for Social Democracy in Sweden has been going on for 
some considerable time. Furthermore, in this election the Party has shed 
voters outside urban areas, in the previously industrialised medium-sized and 
small towns and communities. Whoever lays claim to govern must have broad 
popular support throughout the country.
A form of Social Democracy based on universalist values must address the 
political challenges and tasks of our time. In addition, the Social Democratic 
organization and its links to the people must be reformed and strengthened. 
Its working processes must be modernised. Moreover, Social Democracy must 
put forward a more coherent and substantial program targeting key political 
areas. This must be combined with sustained and resolute leadership which 
can unite a broad church of electoral support and avoid internal conflict. 
Herein lies the enormous challenge which faces Social Democracy in Sweden 
and in Europe. The outcome will determine if it will be possible to form a 
progressive government in the future.
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POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL OVERVIEW
In 2018, Australian Labor is poised to dominate national politics for the 
next parliamentary term, and perhaps the next decade. This is no small 
achievement, given the turbulence of the last ten years. Australia’s distinctive, 
hybrid approach to social democracy has regained traction during uncertain 
times. Yet it remains vulnerable to deeper forces which have unravelled 
mainstream politics in many other countries.
While it is back on the front foot, Australian Labor still needs to renew its 
culture, organisation and working philosophy. For the party and its allies, the 
heart of this uncertainty is the relationship between centralised, institutional 
power and the need to engage a wider and more diverse community in creating 
the governance and policy solutions of a new era.
In a federal nation, Labor currently holds government in 5 out of 8 states 
and territories. The federal party, led by Bill Shorten, a lawyer and former 
union national secretary, holds a consistent, election-winning lead over the 
right wing Coalition government since shortly after the last federal election, 
in 2016, at which Labor reduced Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s 
parliamentary majority to 1 seat.
A decade after the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Australia’s 
economy and welfare state appear in rude good health, at least comparatively. 
Yet economic inequality, population growth, social diversity and environmental 
damage are multiplying as challenges, while mainstream political debate 
remains largely trapped within a consensus forged during the 1980s. 
Australia formed the world’s first Labor government in 1904. Its twentieth-
century record of innovation in social democratic governance, combined 
with its enviable position on the edge of South East Asia’s resurgence, has 
cushioned the nation from the harshest impacts of global recession and 
austerity.
As well as successful economic stimulus, the Rudd and Gillard governments 
of 2007-13 forged significant policy achievements, but were undermined by 
leadership instability fuelled by the internal contradictions of simultaneously 
attempting ambitious policy reform, growth in jobs and GDP and post-crisis 
fiscal repair. 
The return of conservative governments led by Tony Abbott (2013-15), 
Malcolm Turnbull (2015-2018) and Scott Morrison (2018-) has demonstrated 
leadership instability and wafer-thin parliamentary majorities are common 
symptoms, rather than primary causes, of political turbulence and 
fragmentation. The declining vote shares of the major parties reflect the 
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growing disdain and detachment of citizens for professional politics and a 
deeper fragmentation in the social, economic and strategic environment. 
The centre right, currently clinging to government, has failed to address these 
conditions or put forward a workable governing strategy, paralysed by its 
internal ideological contradictions. Meanwhile, federal Labor has successfully 
unified in opposition, built on the policy agenda established during the Gillard-
Rudd period, and progressively sharpened its focus on economic inequality. 
POLITICAL STRATEGY AND NARRATIVE: A SHARPER 
FOCUS ON INEQUALITY
So Australian Labor has apparently rediscovered its ability to combine 
pragmatic political strategy with a winning approach to medium-term 
policy reform. In the last two years they have out-manoeuvred the Liberal-
National government with spending commitments to infrastructure, health 
and education, funded with budget headroom created by winding back tax 
concessions that disproportionately favour the holders of housing and share-
market wealth.
Labor remains firmly committed to a liberal market economy, extending global 
trade and embracing public-private partnerships, while pursuing scientific and 
educational innovation in the cause of future productivity. But it has allowed 
itself to question more visibly the distribution of wealth and opportunity in the 
post-crisis global economy.
Its agenda includes increasing compulsory superannuation contributions 
year by year from 9.5 to 12 per cent of wages, fully implementing a National 
Disability Insurance Scheme, delivering more equitable needs-based school 
funding, and expanding university and vocational training places. Carbon 
pricing and national broadband, two areas which caused huge controversy 
during 2007-13 and where the Liberal government has changed direction, have 
been managed pragmatically by Labor to maintain clear party diﬀerences and 
expose ideological faultlines on the centre right.
TAX AS THE DIVIDING LINE
The issue now at the centre of the political contest, which has shifted 
decisively in recent years, is the treatment of tax, specifically the taxation 
of wealth, and its relationship to living standards and class divisions across 
the country. For the last decade, both wage growth and public revenue from 
corporate profits have been subdued in Australia. The share of income going 
to capital, compared to labour, is at its highest for more than 60 years. Wealth 
and income inequality have grown while generational mobility has dropped. 
For all parties, the question of how to lift living standards has therefore grown 
more urgent and come into increasing focus, alongside the challenges of 
increasing public spending on infrastructure and services in a country where 
the population is both growing and ageing steadily.
Labor’s historical role as champion of universal health, education and 
pensions comes to the fore here. Since the 1980s, Australian Labor has also 
championed privatisation, free trade and market liberalisation, forging a model 
pioneered by Bob Hawke and Paul Keating that influenced Blair, Clinton and 
Schröder, among others. Today’s Labor party remains firmly committed to 
Keating-era market economics, but has skillfully read a shifting environment, 
and recognised that tax concessions designed to encourage home and share 
ownership have become large-scale distortions. Labor’s willingness to tackle 
these subsidies for investors in capital assets has won it policy credibility and 
given it room for manouevre to make progressive spending commitments. 
Whether it has renewed its approach to political economy thoroughly enough 
to tackle the contemporary challenges of housing aﬀordability, casualisation 
and intergenerational equity is an open question. But the Liberal-National 
government, in the absence of any other agenda, has reinforced this dividing 
line by putting forward long term tax cuts for companies and individuals, 
attempting the abolition of a whole bracket of personal income tax and a 
reduction in company tax that would overwhelmingly favour a small number 
of very large corporations. These plans have, so far, been frustrated in the 
Australian Senate and failed to find favour with the public. 
The stage is set for what could be a threshold election by mid-2019. A decade 
ago, Labor would have felt it had to match and neutralise such commitments. 
Today its attacks on the Liberal policies reflect both the pragmatic reality 
of the Labor’s own spending commitments and a deeper shift, which is 
resonating with many voters, towards stronger support for redistribution.
PARTY ORGANISATION: CAMPAIGNING SUCCESS,
GOVERNANCE FAILURE
Yet while Labor has skillfully navigated a changing fiscal landscape, deeper 
challenges to social democracy loom. The disruptions of technology, inequality, 
environmental crisis, identity politics and regional conflict are still eroding 
the foundations of Australia’s twentieth century success. The vote share of 
minor parties has grown from 8.6 per cent in 1980 to 23.1 per cent in 2016, 
and that includes a One Nation party dedicated to racist populism.¹ Engaging 
and persuading increasingly diverse and digitally connected communities to 
make the contributions and compromises required for twenty-first century 
governance solutions is a huge challenge.
Labor’s campaign strategy and infrastructure – the ‘ground game’ – is 
consistently out-performing its competitors. Known as the Community Action 
Network, this model describes itself as the ‘grassroots, organising arm’ of 
Labor, and builds on Obama-era campaign models and from the campaigning 
strategies now used by UK Labour and other left parties around Europe.  
¹ http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-03/election-results-historical-comparison/7560888 
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Like comparable eﬀorts in other countries, the model combines intensive 
use of phone banks, door-knocking teams and digital contact lists with issue-
based social media campaigning by candidates. Teams of trained activists train 
and coordinate a network of volunteers to make phone calls and door-knock 
undecided voters and put on street stalls at shopping centres and community 
events. Aﬃliated trade unions and community organisations mobilise their 
members to add to these campaigns, creating a formidable operation.  
The renewal of its campaigning model has given Labor a powerful advantage 
in a string of recent Australian elections. But it has not dealt with Australian 
Labor’s great vulnerability: its inability to move beyond factionalised, machine-
based decision-making in its own forums and structures, including national and 
state conferences, selection of candidates for public oﬃce, and overall party 
administration. 
Every political party has factions; they are arguably an important, even a 
necessary, contribution to intellectual diversity and political management. 
The problem arises, as in Australia’s case, when they form an unholy alliance of 
closed decision-making structures, creating a vested interest in maintaining 
the status quo in favour of broader engagement, more diverse participation, 
policy and organisational renewal. 
Bill Shorten, the current federal leader, advocated in 2014 for a ‘membership-
based party’, moving away from factions and embracing more democratic 
transparency. But since 2015 party reform has stalled and membership has 
dipped again to around 50,000. As Mark Butler, Labor’s most recent national 
president recently argued, this does not qualify as a mass movement in a 
country of 27 million people.
Political players willing to risk their power base or reputation for the sake 
of institutional reform are hard to find, despite widespread acceptance 
that renewal is overdue. Meanwhile, as the stasis continues, the wider 
bonds between political organisation, civil society, workplaces and citizen 
participation are being lost.
EQUITY AMIDST DIVERSITY: KEY IDEAS AND ISSUES
  
Beyond the core policy agenda of education, health, social insurance and 
marginal tax rates, Australia faces a host of complex issues driven by the 
growth of a more diverse, connected and unequal society; and by a region 
increasingly influenced by strategic rivalry between China and the USA. 
These latter issues play out in the regulation of foreign investment in housing 
and agriculture, the availability of university services to foreign students 
and controversy over Chinese funding of Australian research, technology 
infrastructure and political parties.
As in many other countries, the impact and ownership of digital technologies 
and automation on the economy and labour market is also increasingly 
potent, bringing a stronger focus on employment rights in casualised and 
network-based industries and a fresh set of questions about the innovation 
partnerships and investments needed for future prosperity. Victoria’s Labor 
state government has recently promised new legal penalties for wage theft 
and industrial manslaughter. Federal Labor is making similar moves towards 
creating employment protections for people working in digital supply chain 
industries. Both levels of government are actively pursuing policies to 
encourage innovative industry-education clusters.
Federal Labor is also committed to holding referendums on whether Australia 
should become a republic (electing its own head of state) and on extending 
parliamentary terms from three years to four. Migration, ethnic and religious 
diversity are also major issues: 28 per cent of Australians were born overseas, 
and while the dynamism and diversity of Australia’s population are largely 
viewed as positives, the potential for racial and religious conflict is real. 
Australia’s shameful ongoing treatment of asylum seekers arriving by boat, 
and reliance on oﬀshore detention and processing facilities, remain an ugly 
scar and an unresolved policy dilemma.
Socially, Labor has become more unashamedly progressive in recent years, 
with state governments are helping to lead policy reform in areas where 
national government can follow. The Victorian government, for example, has 
reformed family violence laws and legalised assisted dying. Federal Labor 
campaigned vigorously, if belatedly, for marriage equality, which was legislated 
federally in 2017. 
AREAS FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES
The arena in which most of these issues combine and play out is in the future 
of Australian cities: one of the most urbanised populations on the planet, 
Australian cities must rapidly transform in order to sustain greater density, 
social inclusion and the quality of life which attracts millions from around the 
world. Australian has begun shifting towards more strategic approaches to 
urban planning and governance and smarter approaches to economic and 
community development.  There are many opportunities to innovate and 
learn around the world in how to grow jobs, services, inclusive housing and 
environmental sustainability, while shaping longer-term urban infrastructure 
to support the public interest for decades to come. 
The inter-relationships between urban development, education, the 
concentration of economic power and shaping of social identities are a 
crucial focus for thinking through the political and policy challenges for 
social democracy and designing new responses over the decades to come. In 
particular, the ALP needs to confront the challenge of how to combine more 
dense and connected urban communities with more complex, innovation-
driven economies which manage to spread economic activity, wealth and 
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knowledge more widely, instead of allowing them to become over-concentrated 
in ways which foster crisis and conflict.  
Given this, and Australia’s intriguing position as a past pioneer of social 
democracy which has largely avoided the full traumas of austerity and identify 
politics, there is a real need for collaboration and mutual learning in the areas 
where everyday experience is changing faster than the institutional status 
quo, and where progressive institutional designs are needed to renew the 
common frameworks underpinning social democratic goals.
These include: 
• Regulating and governing the digital economy and introducing equitable 
models of taxation and worker rights into digital supply chains
• Progressive urban governance and economic decentralisation
• Public transport and infrastructure investment strategies
• Housing aﬀordability, urban development and intergenerational equity
• Democratisation of political parties and new models for civic and 
community engagement in public decision-making
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
‘Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue’. At 
first glance this old English rhyme sits oddly amid a discussion of Australian 
social democracy circa 2018. Yet it is a more than handy guide to the task 
confronting the torchbearer of social democracy down under, the 127 year-
old Australian Labor Party, and parties internationally. The answers to our 
common problems demand transnational collaboration between parties, a 
hallmark of local and global social democracy at its best in the past, and a 
guiding theme this chapter returns to throughout.
The present challenge facing Australian Labor and its sister parties are 
remarkably similar. The shadow of the 2008-09 global financial crisis haunts 
Labo(u)r parties and the trade union movement the world over and failed to 
realise predictions of a social democratic renaissance. The global economy 
is precariously placed and the local outlook, despite a short-term boost to 
government revenues courtesy of rising commodity process and taxation 
receipts, remains uncertain. 
Full-time work is threatened by the rise of insecure employment – casual, 
part-time or contract and labour-hire work. Wages growth has been stagnant 
for a decade. By contrast, working Australians face rising cost of living 
pressures – housing, rents, childcare, energy prices and health insurance – 
amid a growing trend of inequality and social immobility. 
2.2. The ALP as seen by Nick Dyrenfurth
Australia is also deeply indebted. In just four and a half years since 
coming to power, the Coalition government has doubled the nation’s debt. 
Commonwealth gross debt is over half a trillion dollars, without any meaningful 
investment in infrastructure, job training and more besides. The recent 
budget forecasts a deficit in 2018-19 of $14.5 billion and promises a slim $2.2bn 
surplus next financial year, based on supremely optimistic economic growth 
and wage growth forecasts. 
These trends only compound an increasing distrust of political institutions, 
major parties and leaders – Australia has churned through six prime ministers 
in just over a decade and governments at both a state and federal level are 
no longer guaranteed more than a single term in oﬃce – replicated elsewhere 
in the developed world, while the spectre of global terrorism, resurgence of 
authoritarian great powers and extremist right-wing politics looms large.
ELECTORAL POLITICS
Australian Labor is not alone in facing such trials. With the exception of 
France, parties of the centre-right currently govern across Europe, and until 
recently in Canada and New Zealand. Social democratic parties have struggled 
in a post-Cold War world defined by free-market economic globalisation, a 
severe decline in union density linked to the erosion of blue-collar working-
class identity, mass migration and technological change. Despite or precisely 
because of the apparent conquest of mass poverty, working class voters 
in suburban and regional Australia are less rusted onto Labor, eroding its 
core vote over the past two decades. Many social democratic and centre-
left parties have a trust deficit as regards economic management and 
immigration. Meanwhile their messaging is often skewed towards a liberal 
universalist, aggressively secular, rights-centred agenda that can struggle to 
resonate emotionally with voters. 
In this vacuum existed appeared the real possibility of a Trump/Brexit style 
phenomenon of disaﬀected working and middle-class Australians turning to 
populist parties of the Right. Yet Australia’s would-be emulators of Donald 
Trump – from Pauline Hanson to Cory Bernardi –were poorly suited to the 
task of replicating his success. Most were and are obsessed with pursuing 
tangential ‘culture wars’ rather than hip-pocket concerns of working people. 
The populist right has failed to split the social democratic base, in part 
because Australian Labor is a more materialist and less cosmopolitan entity 
than most Western social democratic parties. Its primary campaign focus is 
wages, jobs and economic insecurity, in turn owing to the significantly larger 
institutional role of unions, no matter their well-documented decline in density, 
which helps to anchor the party’s policy focus. 
This much was signalled by Labor’s improved performance at the 2016 federal 
election, where the party almost formed government after just one term in 
opposition following its 2013 defeat – its worst since the Great Depression. 
There have been recent victories, too, at a batch of recent state elections. 
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Only South Australia, where the party held power for almost two decades, has 
bucked the trend. Labor governs in five of eight state and territories. Polling 
consistently shows Labor on track to win government at a federal level at an 
election, which must be held before the end of 2019. 
Electoral success, or its prospect, ought not to encourage complacency.
There remains the task of crafting a positive, relevant Labor agenda 
committed to the basic concerns, needs and aspirations of working 
Australians, and of brokering a revived national politics of the common good, in 
order that the next national Labor government can enshrine a transformative 
legislative agenda.
STRATEGY AND NARRATIVE
One of the keys to Australian Labor’s resilience, notably at a federal level, 
is the relative consistency and coherence of its post-2013 strategy aimed 
towards winning or indeed retrieving support from outside the inner-cities 
(in British parlance, metropolitan centres) and narrative of a ‘fair go’ for all 
and protection of the ‘Australian way of life’, one which has drawn sustenance 
from both movement and national traditions, in addition to the realisation that 
electoral salvation will not arrive from the coming of a Messiah, or aping the 
polices and narrative strategy of long-dead Labor governments. Since 2013, 
Labor has been far more open to a contest of ideas within its ranks, and ideas 
from sister parties and like-minded thinkers, notably revisionism of the federal 
governments of the 1980s and 1990s, and under federal leader Bill Shorten’s 
charge largely abandoned technocratic language. 
Key to that task is, as I have argued elsewhere, a reckoning with Labor’s ‘1066 
and all that’ moment.² To borrow a phrase from Blue Labour figure Maurice 
Glasman, the Hawke-Keating governments (1983-1996) became for many the 
Platonic ideal of a reformist Labor administration by means of floating the 
dollar, deregulating the economy and privatising government assets. But 
where Thatcher carried out this agenda in the United Kingdom by attacking 
unions, Labor worked with them via the ‘Accord’ and by implementing a ‘social 
wage’. Through an emphasis on prudent economic management and national 
consensus Hawke avoided his Labor predecessor Gough Whitlam’s electoral 
fate (dismissed by the Governor-General in 1975 after a tumultuous three 
years in oﬃce). 
This ‘1983 and all that’ view was a repressive force in two ways. First, the 
party in government, as seen between 2007 and 2013, struggles to live up 
to those herculean standards. Second, an overweening deference to that 
era blocked the path to philosophical and policy renewal. Beginning with the 
ascent of Whitlam in the 1960s, hastening under Hawke-Keating, but reaching 
its apotheosis during the Rudd-Gillard era, Labor placed too much faith in 
² Nick Dyrenfurth, ‘Back to the future: 1983 and all that’ The Age, 28 December 2013, online at 
https://www.theage.com.au/national/back-to-the-future-1983-and-all-that-20131227-2zzhl.html
the ability of centralised government and free markets to solve society’s 
problems. In short, Labor embraced a bloodless form of statist liberalism 
– economic and increasingly social – at odds with its original purpose and 
orientation towards national tradition and a language fashioned towards the 
basic aspiration of leading a good, secure and meaningful life: the very reason 
Labor was put on this earth. 
As the founders of the party declared in 1890 in the wake of the disastrous 
1890 Maritime Strike, only by securing representation in parliament it 
suggested, “can we […] ensure to every man, by the opportunity of fairly 
remunerated labour, a share in those things that make life worth living”. It is a 
reminder that Labor’s values and language are those of the Australian people: 
work, family, community, and a sense of fairness and decency. Moreover Labor 
has never been a straightforwardly ‘progressive’ party in the term’s modern 
sense. Its disposition, rather, was as always informed by small ‘c’ conservatism 
and other traditions such as Catholic social teaching, non-conformist religions 
and localised institutions of working-class self-help. Appealing to such a 
disposition remains relevant to Labor’s approach to many issues from job 
security, workplace power, automation as well as climate change and
universal healthcare.
Under Shorten’s leadership Labor has largely eschewed small-target politics 
and the siren song of identity politics. It has, moreover, moved on from seeking 
to ape the reform agenda of the Hawke–Keating years. Shorten has positioned 
the parliamentary party as an alternative government more resistant 
to exogenous shocks. Post-GFC politics, where the agenda is not overly 
dominated by cutting personal taxes and spending courtesy of a cashed-up 
government, but a precarious economy and growing inequality, seems to signal 
that the times might suit Labor. 
Its response to the recent commonwealth budget signals as much. While 
it committed itself to providing taxation relief to working and middle-class 
Australians, and increased spending on health and education, by virtue of its 
prudent policy work on revenue and expenditure, it also promised to reduce 
national debt faster, presenting itself as the party of fiscal responsibility. 
Hard, collective toil remains however. Labor has formed majority national 
government twice in the last twenty-five years: when it neutralised or 
overturned the Coalition’s advantage in matters economic. It is a timely and 
ongoing reminder: Labor is not going to win power at a national election by 
adopting a strategy from the progressive playbook of identity politics.
ORGANISATIONAL STATE OF PLAY
Australian Labor has been defined by its relationship with the union 
movement. The party was founded by working-class unionists, and unions 
continue to occupy a formal place in its structure as aﬃliated bodies. It is 
a rarity in this sense – most of the world manages to get by without such a 
party. Indeed, there are a handful of aﬄuent, developed countries that do not 
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boast any major party calling itself ‘labor’, ‘social democratic’ or ‘socialist’ – 
the United States is the most significant of them. Despite Labor’s electoral 
resilience since 2013, there have been increasing calls for ‘party reform’ under 
the guise of democratisation. 
 
Some point to Labor’s national membership, which, having increasing by 
some twenty per cent to around 55,000 members after the 2013 election 
defeat, since plateaued. In response, there have been renewed calls to open 
up the party’s decision-making – and conversely remove power from so-called 
factional powerbrokers and union leaders – to rank-and-file members in order 
to attract new members. Since September 2013 members have possessed an 
equal say in helping elect, alongside federal parliamentary caucus members 
(MPs), the federal leader. But the call for a direct say has extended to electing 
federal Senators and state-based Upper House members and even the 
introduction of an inexpensive ‘supporter’ category of membership which 
would provide voting rights in the manner of the British Labour Party. (US-
style primaries, opening up the party’s preselections to the public, have fallen 
by the wayside). 
 
In part this owes to factional rivalry, overlapping with a debate about the 
appropriate role of trade unions and union leaders in party matters. Most 
calls to democratise the party along these terms have come from a section 
of the party’s Left, predominantly inner-city based and middle class, which 
historically perform wells in such ballots, and which is close to winning power in 
the party’s major organisational centres of power – for instance the triennial 
national conference and powerful national executive. The results of internal 
elections for these forums and the National Presidency currently underway 
will go some way towards determining the fate of these proposals. 
Extreme caution is required. First, boosting gross membership is a misleading 
aim. The challenge ought to be recruiting new members from the ‘new 
precariat’ and from suburban and regional Australia, Labor’s core voter block, 
rather than continuing the ‘middle-classing’ of the modern ALP. Second, a 
party established by unions and mainly manual workers must necessarily 
ponder its policies, strategies, rules and structures at a time when unions 
represent a declining portion of the workforce, and blue-collar workers have 
dwindled to a small minority of employees. Yet unions are fundamental to the 
struggle against growing economic inequality. Aﬃliated unions still supply 
much of Labor’s financial support and wield fifty per cent of conference floor 
votes. Australia would be a diﬀerent place without a union-aﬃliated party. 
 
Historian Robin Archer has argued that if the US had followed our lead, it is 
“likely that business interests would have had less influence over public policy, 
that income and wealth would have been more equally distributed, that unions 
would have been stronger and that a more comprehensive welfare state 
would have developed”. Quite apart from valuable funds and organisational 
muscle, an army of unionist foot soldiers has always been essential to Laborite 
electioneering. When Labor emerged as a political force at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, its success owed most to the unions. Strong unions 
ensured Labor’s survival across the century amid war, depression and Cold 
War politics. Labor’s 2007 federal election victory owed much to the hard-slog 
of unionists in marginal seats campaigning against the deregulatory, anti-union 
‘Workchoices’ legislation of the then Coalition government. 
 
As former ministerial adviser-cum-academic Trevor Cook notes, “The union 
relationship, at its best, gives the ALP a direct connection with thousands 
of activists, hundreds of community organisations and, potentially, millions 
of voters. Even in an era of professional politics […] this organic connection 
with the electorate can be highly potent”. Finally, the current 50/50 balance 
between MPs and members in electing the federal leader is appropriate: Labor 
would do well to avoid the destabilising situation whereby the leader did not 
enjoy the confidence of his or her parliamentary colleagues. While not to be 
dismissed, a narrow focus on organisational ‘reform’ seems incongruent with 
the priorities of a federal election year and the greater challenge of ensuring a 
truly transformative national Labor government.
A NEW POLICY SETTLEMENT?
There has been relative uniformity surrounding Labor’s policy modus operandi 
since 2013. Inequality has figured centrally, notwithstanding diﬀerences in 
respect of introducing a so-called ‘Buﬀet rule’ on high-income earners and 
a Universal Basic Income. Restoring bargaining power between labour and 
capital, restoring penalty rates and providing a more equitable and sustainable 
taxation system have each figured prominently, along with a commitment to 
universal health funding and greater spending on education, whether primary 
and secondary schooling, university or TAFE. These quibbles in addition to 
the long-running debate over refugee policy and migration law will be debated 
at Labor’s forthcoming national conference. Labor’s formal response to the 
budget promised a recalibration of the taxation system with lower taxes for 
working and middle-class Australians and the abandonment of the Coalition’s 
planned $65 billion corporate taxation cuts (reducing the rate from thirty per 
cent to twenty five per cent by 2025), funding schools and hospitals, notably 
reducing Australia’s national debt and much besides. Yet there is scope to 
shape these polices into a more transformative agenda.    
One source of transformative politics pertains to Australia’s workplace 
and corporate culture, amid a broader discussion of inequality and unequal 
bargaining power between labour and capital. As suggested earlier, the 
tenets of the Australian way of life – a fair days pay for a fair day’s work, 
equal opportunity for all and preventing excessive inequalities of wealth, 
status and power – are fraying, yet remain key to Australian’s sense of their 
national identity. Though avoiding the GFC’s worst eﬀects, inequality has 
risen to heights not seen since the early 1940s. Good, secure, well-paying 
jobs are being replaced by low-skill, low-wage insecure work. Less than half 
of Australian workers hold down full-time jobs; 23 per cent are employed 
casually. Underemployment is at record highs. Company profits increased 
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by 40 per cent in 2017, yet wages growth is sluggish. The fruits of 26 years 
of continuous, record economic growth have not been shared equally, which 
is bad for working people, bad for the economy, and bad for democracy, 
encouraging mistrust and extremism. In any case, world-beating growth 
numbers belie a more fragile outlook. Productive investment is poor. Exports 
are less diversified than any time since the 1950s. Economic institutions are 
not working in the interests of the majority.
 
To revive the Australian way, a new policy settlement is required. Australians 
are keen to see more bipartisanship and co-operation, and not just in politics. 
To address the big challenges facing our country we need a workplace and 
corporate culture fit for purpose in the twenty-first century, and re-creating 
a resilient pro-business, pro-worker framework which prizes profit and 
productivity as much as co-operation and fairness. Stronger, more balanced 
institutions are needed to sustain a high-growth, high-skill and high-wage 
economy tailored towards the long-run, not one sustained by ephemeral 
mining and property booms, or which relies upon lazy, counter-productive 
measures such as cutting wages. 
 
One idea, drawn from Germany, is to encourage and, if need be, legislate for 
employee representatives on company boards, known as codetermination. 
There is not space to outline the benefits of codetermination in Europe, 
but suﬃce to say there are precedents for its Australian implementation, 
notwithstanding our unitary board structure versus Germany’s two-tier 
system of supervisory and management boards.
 
Codetermination is worth pursuing by Labor for a number of specific and 
general reasons. Employee representation would improve boardroom 
diversity by incorporating employee voices and raise profits through greater 
productivity and collaboration. Workers would enjoy higher wages and better, 
more secure working conditions. Codetermination might militate against 
financial diﬃculties leading to the sudden collapse of firms as in the recent 
case of steelmaker Arrium and prevent companies from disregarding their 
social responsibilities, so devastatingly revealed by the current Banking Royal 
Commissions. It can tackle excessive CEO remuneration that does not align 
with performance, and thus restore public trust in corporate Australia.
 
How specifically could the system be implemented? We already have a form 
of codetermination in place: superannuation where employee representatives 
sit on not-for-profit, industry fund trustee boards with employers. These 
funds have provided above average investment returns to members as well 
as investing in quality long-term infrastructure investments. Buttressed by 
industry funds Australia has built one of the largest and most productive 
pools of savings in the world in just a quarter of a century, and in turn 
superannuation has opened the door to a more secure, comfortable 
retirement was opened to millions. Codetermination is a bottom-up nation-
building reform which can help grapple with the opportunities and challenges 
of the machine age, which moves beyond the dualistic choice of state and 
market. It can build a new policy settlement in the manner of the early 
nineteenth century, post-World War Two Keynesian bipartisanship and 
modernising Hawke-Keating era. It is a transformative Labor politics of the 
common good which can rejuvenate democracy, when our democracy most 
needs it.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLABORATION 
We return then to the question of inter-party cooperation. There is a long 
tradition among western left-of-centre parties looking to the electoral 
strategies and thinking of fellow-travellers. Australian Labor’s precocious 
electoral growth during the 1890s and 1900s won the attention of European 
observers and, in turn, owed much to the influence of various strands of 
socialist thought emanating from Britain as well as American-style populism. 
The Curtin and Chifley government’s post-World War Two reconstruction 
programme and extension of the welfare state looked to developments in the 
Anglosphere. Conversely, British Labour’s Third Way thinking championed by 
Tony Blair and others in the mid-1990s was influenced by the experience of 
the Hawke/Keating Labor governments the previous decade. Whitlam drew on 
British Labour intellectual Anthony Crosland’s revisionism of the 1950s, as he 
modernised the ALP in the late 1960s. 
For Australian Labor and other like-parties there is a pressing task to renew 
a relevant social democratic politics and to build a new policy settlement 
within and without their countries. Key is the challenge in a globalised world 
of building a modern, thriving and diverse economy that creates and sustains 
well-paid, secure jobs. For Labor it means reviving the Australian way – a 
dynamic social market economy underpinned by a commitment to democracy 
and equality. This is a policy framework which is both social and democratic in 
that it does not automatically look to the market or state as the first solution 
to a problem. Importantly, it has the potential to tackle growing inequality
at source. 
Conversely social democrats ought usefully look to Australian Labor as an 
example of a party which has by and large avoided the pitfalls of identity 
politics in favour of ‘bread and butter’ strategy, narrative and policy 
seeped in the national tradition. Key is moving beyond statist liberalism and 
recognising our rich heritage: at once radical and progressive; conservative 
and traditionalist; romantic and rational; patriotic and internationalist. It’s our 
future too. The ideals and needs that drove working men and women to found 
Australian Labor in 1891 are still relevant, whether old, new, borrowed or blue.
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GERMANY
The crisis of social democracy has reached Germany in a slow and creeping 
manner. The SPD’s polling figures have been declining steadily since 2002, and 
the prospect of winning elections now seems rather dim. Nonetheless, the SPD 
has governed under the leadership of Angela Merkel for nine of the past
16 years. 
However, the party’s chances of ruling in a future coalition as the senior 
rather than the junior partner appear slender. The SPD is currently far away 
from achieving the election results to which it was once accustomed. In the 
last three elections (2009, 2013 and 2017) the Social Democrats failed even to 
reach 30 percent. In 2017, party leader and chancellor candidate Martin Schulz 
barely polled more than 20 percent – the worst result in federal elections 
since World War Two. 
Gone are the golden ages of the SPD in the late 1960s and 70s, when Willy 
Brandt and Helmut Schmidt achieved results well over 40 percent. And even 
the era of Gerhard Schröder, when the German version of New Labour (known 
as the Neue Mitte), polled around 40 percent in three consecutive elections, 
now seems very distant.
The current outlook for the SPD is bleak, not only given its weak electoral 
performances, but also in view of the party’s ideological malaise and its limited 
strategic options. The SPD has struggled to cope with various developments, 
which, in combination, have eroded the party’s electoral bases.
 
First, reforms to the welfare state carried out by Gerhard Schröder (known 




Source: Compilation by Håkan A Bengtsson. The red and blue blocks in the last six elections.
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and fuelled support for Die Linke, a left-wing party which grew out of the 
former GDR state party PDS. Die Linke’s strong electoral base in the east of 
the country, where the SPD has struggled to gain votes ever since German 
reunification in 1990, has been supplemented by defections from the SPD by 
disillusioned left-wingers in western Germany. Oskar Lafontaine, one of the 
biggest political talents of his time, left the Schröder government following 
a clash with the chancellor. His departure to Die Linke bolstered a party 
on the left of SPD that has gathered support among the Social Democrats’ 
traditional working-class clientele, who have been harmed by the
welfare reforms.
 
Second, Angela Merkel has moved the CDU into the political centre ground. 
She has adopted several policies that had been at the core of the SPD’s and 
even the Green Party’s programme, such as the phase-out of nuclear power 
and the transition towards sustainable energy production. At the same time, 
the CDU has modernised its policies on social issues such as family, childcare 
and minority rights. This process has given the party access to a young 
urban milieu that would traditionally have been inclined to vote for the Social 
Democrats or the Greens. 
Third, Angela Merkel and the CDU have been perceived as an anchor of 
stability during the global financial crisis and the subsequent crisis of the 
eurozone. This perception of the CDU has endured despite the chaotic 
developments during the summer of 2015, as large numbers of Syrian refugees 
migrated to Europe.
Fourth, the migration crisis of 2015 fuelled the rise of a new party on the right 
of the political spectrum, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). This populist 
group capitalized on voters’ worries that the government had lost control 
over its borders. The AfD has attempted to drive a wedge between voters 
and traditional parties, such as the SPD, by depicting these parties as part of 
the establishment. The party gained over ten percent in the last election, and 
has further eroded the support base of the SPD. Currently it polls at around 
18 per cent, which makes it the second largest party ahead of the Social 
Democrats.
Fifth, and as a result of these developments, the SPD has lost entire regions 
of Germany. In the former areas of East Germany, in the south of the country, 
and in rural constituencies more generally, the party is highly unlikely to win 
either regional elections or parliamentary seats in federal elections. In short, 
the SPD has haemorrhaged votes to parties on all sides, losing support among 
poorer and working-class voters as well as the liberal middle class.
1. PARTY NARRATIVE AND STRATEGY
The SPD is confronted with several challenges concerning strategy and 
narrative. On strategy the party faces a significant dilemma in Germany’s 
current multi-party system. At the moment, the Social Democrats are 
prevented by electoral mathematics and poor relations with other parties 
from forming a coalition with anyone other than the CDU/CSU. An alliance with 
their traditional ally, the Green Party, does not have suﬃcient numbers: nor 
does a three-way coalition including Die Linke. A coalition between the three 
parties would have produced a parliamentary majority in 2013, but was not 
realized due to the deep mistrust, as well as significant policy diﬀerences on 
foreign relations and defence, between the SPD and Die Linke. Cooperation 
with the centre-right FDP (the liberal party called the Free Democrats) is 
unlikely under the latter’s current neoliberal leadership. Thus, the unloved 
“Grand Coalition” with the CDU/CSU represents the only chance for the 
SPD to govern. The Social Democrats’ role as junior partner in this alliance 
seriously restricts their ability to determine Germany’s future progress.
The narrative of the SPD has not changed significantly over the last decade, as 
the party still relies on the Basic Manifesto of 2007 (the so-called Hamburger 
Programme). Yet an examination of the last election manifesto (“Time for 
More Justice”) reveals a fundamental issue facing the SPD. The introduction 
states that life in Germany is good at present, and that citizens generally have 
few grievances. However, the manifesto then lists a series of pledges to bring 
about greater social justice and to guarantee, in a rather general manner, a 
secure future. Here, it is evident that the party is treading a thin line. On the 
one hand, it is diﬃcult to convey the necessity for redistributive policies when, 
as the SPD acknowledges, current conditions are relatively rosy. On the other 
hand, emphasising the persistence of inequality causes voters to question why 
a party that has been in power for most of the 21st century has not yet acted 
to remedy this. Since 1998 the SPD has continuously been in government, 
with the exception of the period 2009-2013. The legacy of Gerhard Schröder’s 
welfare reforms, in particular, has undermined the confidence among working-
class voters that the SPD has their best interests in mind.
The former party leader Sigmar Gabriel warned in 2016 that the SPD was 
being perceived merely as a ‘welfare state repair station’, and was failing to 
oﬀer hope for a better society. By using this metaphor, Gabriel alluded to 
the absence of a positive narrative, which combines economic progress with 
social justice. Commentators such as Robert Misik likewise argue that the 
SPD’s messages succeed only in conveying the promise: “We will slow down the 
decline”.
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AND WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE?
The SPD has been subjected to constant reform and overhaul. Since 2005 
the party has had six diﬀerent leaders (not counting interim leaders) as well 
as six general secretaries. Digitalisation and changes in the membership have 
challenged the SPD’s organizational structure. The party has experimented 
with various kinds of events, such as thematic conferences, regional events, 
and congresses, in an attempt to enhance communication between the 
members and the party leadership. 
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The party is regionally structured. The core elements are the 12,500 local 
branches, which feed into 20 regional bodies. Delegates from the regional level 
are elected for the federal congress, the party’s main body, which elects the 
leader and the executive board and decides on policy direction. 
One of the organizational challenges for the party has been the existence of 
diﬀerent power bases. The party leader can rely on the SPD’s administrative 
team at its Willy-Brandt-Haus headquarters, as well as the regular meetings 
of the executive board. The party’s parliamentary group, however, often takes 
a diﬀering line on policy, particularly when it is chaired by someone other than 
the party leader. This was the case during the years in opposition from 2009 
to 2013, although Andrea Nahles now holds the posts of both party leader and 
chair of the parliamentary group. 
The third power base is made up of the regional branches, especially in those 
larger Bundesländer where the SPD is or has recently been in government. 
North Rhine-Westphalia, the biggest region in Germany, was governed until 
May 2017 by the SPD, and the party gained power in Lower Saxony just two 
weeks after losing the federal election last autumn. Bringing together these 
power bases – the party administration, the parliamentary group, and the 
regions – and conveying a coherent message is a challenge that has eluded 
many SPD leaders in the past.
3. KEY POLICY IDEAS AND ISSUES
The SPD advocates a broad variety of ideas, ranging from classic welfare 
state policies to proposals on how to shape the labour market in times of 
digitalisation and automation (Work 4.0). However, if one takes into account 
the SPD’s manifestos and policy implementation over the past two decades, a 
few landmarks can be identified. 
As mentioned earlier, the welfare state reforms of Hartz IV were a centrepiece 
of the Social Democratic government’s policies at the beginning of the new 
millennium. They marked a turn away from the traditional German welfare 
insurance system. Among the key elements were an active labour-market 
policy, means-testing of benefits, and the merging of the unemployment 
insurance with social assistance payments, which resulted in reduced overall 
benefit instalments. These policies were accompanied by the slogan “Fördern 
und Fordern” (To Support and To Exact). 
More recently, the SPD focussed on the introduction of a minimum wage, 
the adjustment of imbalances in the pension scheme as well as in the labour 
market, the consolidation of civil rights, e.g. same-sex-marriage, and the 
promotion of equal opportunities for men and women. The introduction of 
an obligatory quota for female representation in corporate boards was a 
particularly significant reform.
During the election campaign of 2017, the SPD made European integration 
a key part of its platform. The party promised to increase the German 
contribution to the European budget, and also pledged, rather more vaguely, 
to promote greater solidarity in Europe – despite SPD politicians having 
consistently voted in favour of austerity measures for southern European 
countries since the eurozone crisis in 2010.
The current party leader, Andrea Nahles, has brought a more strategic 
perspective to the SPD. Ever since her time as the party’s general secretary, 
she has taken part in extensive debates on concepts such as “The Good 
Society”. More recently, during her spell as minister for labour she focused on 
the looming challenges accompanying automation and digitalisation. She has 
initiated working groups on Work 4.0 and Digital Capitalism, giving the SPD 
the scope to adopt a more critical stance on aspects of modern capitalism 
than it has done for many years previously. 
4. ISSUES AND AREAS IN WHICH COLLABORATION BETWEEN 
COUNTRIES FEELS ESSENTIAL
The SPD faces the same challenges as other social democratic parties in 
Europe. Therefore, areas of collaboration and dialogue between countries can 
be identified in several areas.
What is the role of social democracy in the 21st century? The first industrial 
revolution brought trade unions and labour-oriented parties to the fore. 
Social democratic parties throughout Europe trace their origins and main 
ideological pillars back to these periods. The 21st century presents diﬀerent 
challenges with a far more liberalised society, the question of sustainability 
and environmental protections, as well as a globalised economy and labour 
market that is changing rapidly due to digitalisation and automation. The 
classic task of social democracy has not been the overthrow of capitalism 
and introduction of socialism. It has instead been the reformist approach, the 
taming of capitalism and the sustaining of social cohesion despite the inherent 
contradictions of the capitalist system. This role needs to be re-evaluated in 
the new circumstances and should be discussed internationally.
How can we deal with “sins” of the past? Most of the social democratic 
parties in Europe enthusiastically promoted globalisation, rolling out the 
red carpet for finance worldwide. These policies of the past are currently 
being questioned within parties and societies alike and present a burden 
for the credibility of social democracy and the trust voters have in their 
representatives. For the SPD, a dialogue on how to deal with its own history in 
a constructive manner and create a forward-looking perspective may
be helpful. 
Social democratic parties have heterogenous voter bases. On the one 
hand, they attempt to appeal to the classic heartlands of social democracy, 
meaning working class constituencies and districts. On the other hand, 
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there are a number of young, urban, educated voters who find the agenda of 
social democracy increasingly attractive. These electoral groups may share 
a common economic agenda, but they diﬀer on cultural issues, from the 
legalization of same-sex marriages to immigration. Social democracy needs to 
find messages that appeal to both of these groups simultaneously. 
Last, but not least, election campaigns have become a multi-level contest 
using membership, traditional media, social media and many other tools. The 
development of new technological instruments is increasing steadily and is 
becoming hard to manage, as well as to aﬀord. 
Progressive parties need to share their experiences on which of these 
instruments work best in which situations. Contact between parties, 
traditionally the preserve of international secretaries and leaders, needs to 
broaden across party structures to allow for a smooth knowledge transfer, so 
that parties can navigate the steep learning curves on every level.
THE     NETHERLANDS
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4. THE NETHERLANDS
By Klara Boonstra and
Wiardi Beckman Stichting 
POLITICAL OVERVIEW
Even political scientists with a benevolent view on the Labour Party of the 
Netherlands agree: the unprecedented defeat in the general election of 2017 
had actually been a long time coming. The decrease of the party’s traditional 
electorate is one factor of importance, but the reasons are more complex. 
The core of the Labour movement itself is at stake, as the party appears less 
successful in connecting the interests of the diﬀerent socio-economic classes 
in society.
Dutch society may, compared to the UK for example, appear as a fairly equal 
society. However, a division into lower, middle, and upper class would be as 
valid here as in most other Western countries. The Labour Party, along with 
the associated trade unions, has always had the purpose to bridge that social 
divide by being what is called ‘a people’s party’, meaning a party that connects 
the interests of all classes in society. 
Under the banner of the welfare state, after World War Two the diﬀerent class 
interests were promoted and looked after by the Labour Party. It was wholly 
acknowledged that these class interests diﬀered to a great extent. Lower 
class people voted Labour predominantly for betterment, to improve their 
lot. People of the middle class wanted good social institutions, like schools and 
higher education and aﬀordable good housing and transportation, and strong 
labour legislation. Very interesting was the position of many in the Dutch 
higher class, who for a long time voted quite progressively. At a first glance 
that may seem odd, because many of the policies that were developed in the 
second half of the former century by Labour in coalition governments, were 
not in the economic interest of the higher class. Examples like progressive 
taxation, the levelling of incomes, high social security benefits and fiscal 
transfers could nevertheless count on the support of a significant ‘leftist’ part 
of the higher class. The explanation for this was that many of these well-oﬀ 
voters were themselves products of the meritocracy. In their lifetimes or that 
of their parents or grandparents, they had experienced a rise on the ladder of 
society, made possible by an emancipatory education system. 
Voter research shows that the connections between the classes that define 
social-democratic politics became undone from the beginning of the 1990s. 
From that time, all sorts of benefits were reduced or cut, as the social 
security system was seriously sobered down. Public services like schools, 
public housing, hospitals and the wider care sector, were all confronted with 
budget cuts and public eﬃciency measures. Although their solidarity with less 
well-oﬀ fellow citizens was intact, the dismantling of the welfare state meant 
that many well-oﬀ voters did not see their sentiments of solidarity reflected 
in politics anymore, and lost the incentive to vote against their own direct 
interests. 
Although maybe to a lesser extent than other countries, the Netherlands was 
also tainted by neo-liberal thinking such as that of New Public Management. 
Overall, society shifted to a philosophy of ‘everyone for themselves’. Taking 
the perspective that solidarity across social classes is the foundation of the 
welfare state, it is clear that its dismantlement led several social democratic 
parties in Europe, including the Dutch, into an existential crisis. 
PARTY NARRATIVE AND STRATEGY
Can all the king’s horses and all the king’s men put the Labour Party, or 
even parties, together again? Nostalgia is very tempting, but hardly ever an 
eﬀective strategy. Still, it is important to research and then to retain the 
good. A potential asset for the Labour Party is the widely shared opinion that 
it has historically increased the well-being of society as a whole. The building 
of the welfare state is acknowledged as a predominantly Labour achievement. 
The declining support for Labour seems to be caused more by the perceived 
lack of protection of the welfare state by Labour than by a specific shift
in policy. 
Dutch Labour is blamed for lacking resistance against, and in some instances 
even giving support to, the market policies that started in the early nineties, 
when the party experienced its own version of ‘Third Way’ politics. During 
these years, the Labour party was the leading partner in subsequent coalition 
governments. Many argue, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, that Labour 
should not have gone along with the ‘marketisation of everything’ of the neo-
liberals in the globalising world, but should have presented an alternative 
direction. 
A proportion of the party’s membership seems to be reminiscing about the 
more glorious days, claiming that all that needs to be done is fall back on the 
party lines that worked so well in the post-war until the eighties era. However, 
others in the party stress that the way forward is to change in order to 
modernise. They point to the decline in the popularity of traditional social-
democratic parties across western democracies and claim social-democrats 
have to reinvent themselves in order to become indispensable for
progress again. 
Although there is no large dispute on the basic values or philosophy of the 
movement, as always in any vital political organisation, some division on the 
appropriate approach is apparent. Notwithstanding this, members generally 
agree that the party should be as inclusive as possible, through uniting the 
interests of those it wants to represent. This implies that it needs to tap 
into new sources, because its rank and file, and even its supporters, do not 
represent the voters that the party has lost in recent elections – often to 
populist parties.
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The narrative of the ‘once in power’ party leaders has to be altered to a 
narrative that requests a new mandate of trust from those who have become 
disillusioned, both inside and outside the party’s rank and file. The tone of 
voice will need to be less governmental or authoritative, and instead be more 
supportive and cooperative in finding solutions for pressing problems. A 
confident attitude will need to be extracted not from being in charge or in 
the lead, but by reinventing ways by which to address the concerns of the 
electorate. The recently adopted leading theme of the campaign is: 
‘Be secure…’ after which follows: good work and income, good housing,  
etc. (see below).
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WHAT IS WORKING AND WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE AND HOW
The acknowledgment that the organisation of the party was too much top-
down, along with a sense among members that its leaders, when they were in 
government, had perhaps lost touch with the base, has led to some joint soul-
searching. Changes to the party leadership, through the appointment of a new 
party chair and a new political leader in parliament, should allow for changes. 
The new leadership are aiming for a more interconnected party, where ideas 
and initiatives, plans and programmes (within the aforementioned ‘Be secure’ 
campaign) are developed in a bottom-up manner. 
Obviously, this cannot be done by declamation, as that would be contrary 
to the philosophy. Changing a worn-in collective attitude is very diﬃcult, 
but support for the programme of change is widespread within the party. 
However, restoring connections between the leadership and the membership 
in itself will not suﬃce to regain touch with society at large, because the 
membership does not necessarily represent the potential voters. The specific 
interconnectedness between classes, which used to secure the electoral base 
of the party, will need to be repaired to strengthen the party’s voter appeal 
once more.
KEY POLICY IDEAS AND ISSUES
In the past year, with a view to regaining trust among a population that 
potentially supports Labour’s principles, and also in a sense to heal the party 
itself, considerable thought has been given to a possible recast of the party. 
During this process, it became clear that the party’s fundamental principles 
need no review. What does need to change is our perspective on how people, 
as individuals or as a group, relate to the societal systems in which they
take part. 
As this may sounds rather abstract, it makes sense to illustrate it with two 
examples of things that recently went wrong. The first example concerns 
what is called ‘protected work’, or work for people who, for either physical 
or psychological reasons, are unable to continuously deliver regular results. 
Traditionally, these groups were catered for through sheltered workplaces 
and other arrangements, run by municipalities. The last government, in 
which Dutch Labour participated, decided that the existing arrangements 
were problematic and went on to overhaul the system, restricting entry into 
sheltered workplaces, and ordering greater productivity from the publicly-
run workplaces that remained. The reasoning was as follows: the old system 
attracted ever more people, meaning that an increasing number of protected 
jobs were provided by the public sector, instead of the labour market at 
large. This development was perceived to be at odds with social-democratic 
principles, which favour giving people the opportunity to develop themselves 
through work on the regular labour market. Labour therefore supported 
the overhaul of protected work. However, as the policy was implemented, 
it was accompanied by budget cuts, while the economic crisis had made 
alternative jobs in the regular labour market sparse. All of this resulted in a 
situation where some sheltered employers had started to use labour practices 
incompatible with the party’s principles. What was intended as a socially 
responsible policy change, ended up leaving individual vulnerable workers 
worse oﬀ.
The second example is that of student allowances, which were also subject 
of an overhaul by the 2012-2017 government in which Labour participated. It 
changed a largely grants-based system into a loans-based system. Several 
academic studies showed that from a systemic point of view, the latter system 
would increase social justice through its redistributive character. However, as 
it was implemented, public opinion turned against the policy, claiming that it 
would discourage students with less wealthy parents from going to university, 
as they would be reluctant to take up a loan to pay for their education. This 
opinion was never fully substantiated by research, and the loans were provided 
under extremely favourable conditions. Regardless, here again, the image 
prevailed that the Labour party was somehow responsible for putting the 
system above the people, for making individuals’ interests subordinate to the 
system.
The Labour Party has to learn from examples like these. Both concern issues 
are that are key to the movement: protecting vulnerable people, making sure 
that all children can develop their talents, and ensuring that every policy 
supports equality. More examples at the heart of the welfare state could be 
given. However, a focus on these issues creates a dilemma when we have to 
draw conclusions and determine consequences. Should the Labour Party shy 
away from change and responsibility on these issues? Should it refrain from 
participating in coalitions, allowing other majorities to maybe even do far more 
damage without us? It is clear, and has been confirmed in party circles, that 
not aiming for political responsibility cannot be the answer to this diﬃcult 
time in our existence.
People within the party have decided to focus on a core of issues that are 
key to the Netherlands. Not surprisingly, on this list are work and a fair 
income, housing, care and cure, education and a sustainable environment. The 
approach shall no longer predominately target systems or institutions, but 
will put the position of people first. The aim is to be an ally and to organise 
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power and counter-power by truly connecting people in movements. Not the 
party itself is key, but the people whose rights and interests the party defends 
and promotes. Obviously, Labour is a political party, not a protest movement. 
The political arena is where it acts. So it will take political responsibility in 
reconstructing systems and building new institutions. Dutch Labour will enter 
into alliances with other parties and movements. But it will always judge its 
own actions by assessing the impact on people first.
ISSUES AND AREAS IN WHICH COLLABORATION 
BETWEEN COUNTRIES FEELS ESSENTIAL
How to face globalisation, neo-liberal economics with all its damaging 
consequences like forced privatisation and market fetishism, platform 
work and robotisation, the decline of collectives and the glorification of the 
individual, unjustified enrichment by CEOs of companies, and flexibilisation 
of work? Tax evasion and unsustainable production, migration of refugees or 
people simply looking to find a better place to live? Sure, the Labour parties 
and movements in Europe and elsewhere have their diﬀerent histories, they 
function in diﬀerent societies, and may have slightly diverging philosophies 
here and there. But their goals are the same in all our countries: to reach 
a fairer, more equal society in which people are able to live freely and lead 
a safe and good life. That ultimate goal makes them a truly international 
movement. The ‘divide-and-conquer’ method of big business and big finance 
that so many governments do not resist leads to private wealth and public 
poverty. Labour parties should never allow the argument to be aired, that 
public spending is costing the country because it is creating a competitive 
disadvantage. Social democracy needs to cherish its achievements in founding 
and developing welfare states together. It is up to social democrats to demand 
good public services that have to be paid by a sound tax system. Labour 
parties need international agreements to guarantee that countries are 
protected against overly strong market forces. They need to learn from our 
policies by exchanging information about them. They need to be represented 
in international organisations and other forms of cooperation. They need to 
stand together wherever possible.
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In 2011, for the first time in its history, the New Democratic Party (NDP) 
became the second-largest party in Canada’s House of Commons. It then 
suﬀered a humiliating defeat in the 2015 elections, losing its status as the 
oﬃcial opposition and falling to third place with just 44 of 338 available seats. 
At the following party convention, delegates showed the door to NDP Leader 
Thomas Mulcair in a no-confidence vote.
 
After a lengthy leadership race, in which all party members could vote, 
the NDP chose its new leader in October 2017: Jagmeet Singh, a provincial 
politician from Ontario. He is the first non-white to head one of Canada’s three 
major parties. Singh beat three federal MPs with 54 percent of the members’ 
votes. The candidates diﬀered little in their ideology, campaigning on issues 
including the energy sector, social welfare and electoral reform.
 
38-year-old Singh is a criminal lawyer with a stellar ascent in Ontario provincial 
politics, first elected to the legislature there in 2011 from a riding in suburban 
Brampton. Many Canadians see in Singh – a Sikh with a penchant for snappy 
suits and striking turbans – a chic, left-wing counterpart to centrist Justin 
Trudeau. But Singh’s selection comes with risks. He does not have a seat in the 
federal parliament, so he’ll be campaigning from the sidelines until 2019. As 
things stand, the NDP is unlikely to seriously dent Trudeau’s popularity in the 
2019 elections. Polls show support for the party at around 15 to 20 percent. 
Canada’s first-past-the-post voting arrangements mean that the party stands 
to lose more seats if votes are spread thinly across several regions.
A heated debate over multiculturalism and religious symbols in the French-
speaking province of Quebec threatens to derail the party’s chances in that 
province. The NDP is currently the second-largest party there, with 16 MPs. 
But Singh’s own Sikh faith, expressed in his choice of attire, is unlikely to 
convince sceptics there that he is willing to uphold the divide between politics 
and religious values. Equally, the appointment of the relatively unknown 
Andrew Scheer as head of the Conservative Party could prove tricky for the 
NDP. Scheer’s ultra-conservative stance on social and fiscal issues is unlikely 
to win him votes from Trudeau’s progressive heartlands of Greater Toronto 
and Quebec. That frees up the Liberals to focus their eﬀorts on repelling an 
attack from the left.
 
However, “sunny ways” Justin Trudeau has recently hit a speed bump himself, 
now lagging in the national polls and at risk of losing two Liberal provincial 
governments (Ontario and Quebec) in 2018. This might reshuﬄe electoral 
fortunes suﬃciently to give the NDP a fighting chance in 2019.
THE NDP’S NARRATIVE
Like most others, Canada’s political system is increasingly leader-centred, and 
strong party brands are the exception rather than the rule. The NDPs current 
narrative is thus largely indistinguishable from that of its leader. Singh’s 
immigrant background, and the discrimination he experienced growing up, 
pushed him into politics. He was bullied at school due to his race, and searched 
by police oﬃcers in Brampton on the flimsiest of grounds. He says he wants to 
use his new position to stand up for the rights of minorities.
The party is hoping Singh will tap into a pool of voters that the Liberals had 
so far reserved for themselves: the multicultural suburbs of Toronto, whose 
metropolitan area counts almost six million residents. Singh’s relative youth – 
he is 25 years Mulcair’s junior – could also help attract younger voters to the 
party. Overall, the NDP has embarked on bolder, louder messaging (“the time 
for timid is over”) in order to recapture the hearts and minds of progressives 
and to mobilize a new cohort of younger, more diverse party activists. 
 
Singh’s weakness of being shut out of parliament is meanwhile being turned 
into a virtue. By crisscrossing the country rather than staying in Ottawa, 
Singh follows a long-haul party-building strategy once famously employed by 
late party leader Jack Layton in the run-up to the 2011 election success. One 
diﬀerence is that Layton had the luxury of four electoral cycles to apply his 
approach. It remains to be seen if NDP members provide Singh with as much 
patience, should he fail to rebuild the party by 2019.
 
Canada’s cities oﬀer another glimmer of hope for Canada’s social democrats: 
centre-left candidates have made gains in Vancouver, Edmonton and Montreal. 
Rather than standing under the NDP banner, candidates form groupings 
with politicians from other progressive parties such as the Greens and the 
Liberals. This “post-partisan” approach might help the national-level NDP 
develop strategies to reach out to new types of voters, easily turned oﬀ by 
old-school campaigning and party establishments of all stripes.
 
The NDP’s party brand reflects a red-green alliance of urban progressives and 
more traditional labour advocates. For a resource-rich country like Canada, 
such a bridge is not always easy to build. The current spat between two NDP-
led provincial governments (Alberta and BC) is exemplary of the strategic 
pitfalls. For now, Singh and the federal NDP seem aligned with the greener, 
anti-development forces, but a key re-election campaign of the Alberta NDP 
immediately precedes the federal election 2019.
PARTY ORGANISATION, FINANCE AND CAMPAIGNING
 
While the party made enormous strides between 2004 and 2015 in 
professionalising its headquarters, and in building organisational capacity, 
it remains deeply indebted from the last election campaign in 2015. As 
of early 2018, the external debt amounted to $3 million, with further 
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significant amounts being owed by the central party to its local constituency 
organisations.
As one of the parting gifts of the ten-year Conservative reign, public financing 
of political parties was abolished in 2015. The Liberal government has so far 
not endeavoured one bit to reinstate something similar. With only $4.9 million 
raised in 2017, fundraising numbers for the NDP are lagging far behind Liberals 
($14.1 million) and Conservatives ($18.9 million). Canada outlawed corporate 
and union donations in 2003, when it created the now defunct public, vote-
based subsidy for political parties. Thus, New Democrats now find themselves 
in the worst of both worlds, with neither public subsidies nor financial support 
from its allies in labour.
 
Hence, it is doubtful that the NDP will be able to match the other two main 
parties in reaching the full federal spending limit of around $25 million (with 
another $25 million spent by local constituency organisations) and will have to 
seek ways to run both air and ground operations on a tight budget.
Digital organizing has been a success story. The creation of a digital 
department helped the NDP hauling in record numbers of donations in 2014-
15, when it was the oﬃcial opposition, looking to form the first ever NDP 
government. This still represents a cost-eﬀective tool for fundraising, just 
that much of the donor appeal has now vaned.
 
Data-driven outreach and party organizing, a hybrid of parliamentary 
outreach done by individual MPs and partisan organising done by organisers, 
still delivers strong intelligence on movable voter groups and mobilizing core 
electors. With a voter participation of roughly 60%, Canadian elections do rely 
on much of the same GOTV techniques as American politics.
 
Regional branding and messaging, crafted to cater to the strong sensibilities 
in various parts of a very vast and diverse country, are a hallmark of NDP 
campaigns. Especially considering Singh’s limited appeal to some regions, it 
can be expected that the party will deploy an elaborate research and targeting 
programme, carefully mixing leader-centred messages with a renewed core 
party brand and distinct elements rooted in regional identity, reinforcing 
regionally-based organizational strengths. 
 
POLICIES IDEAS AND PROPOSALS
 
Blame for the 2015 defeat has been laid at the door of the platform, which 
supposedly allowed the centrist Liberals under Trudeau to outflank the NDP 
on the left. While this is not borne out by the actual platform commitments, 
and even less so by the actions of the current Liberal government, the 
conundrum remains: how could the NDP let its hegemony on social issues
slip away? 
For one, social democratic policy proposals need to be formulated in a more 
poignant, much bolder fashion because many hallmarks of social democratic 
policy (daycare, pharmacare, home care) have long been paid lip service to, 
watered down, and then partially implemented by Liberal governments on all 
levels. New Democrats have often been belittled as “Liberals in a hurry”, but 
in the long run, hegemony over social policy can only be regained by proposing 
novelty ideas. 
 
One such opportunity not yet looked at by the Liberals is the concept of a 
guaranteed minimum income (GMI). While there are many versions thereof, 
and pitfalls include succumbing to a “big government, big-spending” label, the 
GMI – in its simplicity and with its basic messaging around “economic security” 
– might go a long way to reconciling the urban job hoppers of tomorrow with 
the more traditional blue-collar working class.
 
Another progressive initiative has been to occupy an “urban agenda” calling 
for major investments in infrastructure, eﬃcient transport and clean energy. 
This is an overt pitch to urban progressives but can also be adapted to aging 
industrial communities. Also, despite of its $100 billion price tag, the Liberal 
government has not been able to deliver many of its pledges in relation to the 
infrastructure programme, much less in a concerted, future-oriented fashion.
 
A coherent approach to the economy and international trade remains one of 
the biggest pitfalls for the NDP. The country urgently needs diversification of 
its economic activities, domestic and abroad, but the shaping of an economic 
narrative remains within Liberal and Conservative hands. A social democratic 
vision of sustainable economic development and fair, open trade relations has 
suﬀered repeated setbacks at the hand of the anti-development forces and 
continues to be marginal in the NDP.
 
As referenced above, the political landscape is divided along the Québec-
Ontario border, when it comes to the accommodation of religious minorities 
and an unfettered application of the Canadian multiculturalism model. 
This major pitfall for the NDP is reflected in many policy areas, from 
decentralisation of immigration rules to culture and language policy, to well-
worn questions around the national identity of Québec and its right to self-
determination. In 2011, New Democrats managed to oﬀer a third way between 
the “two solitudes” but have pained ever since to maintain this advantage. 
+2:726('8&(7+(85%$162&,$/ǃ/,%(5$//()7
 
One of the most obvious common struggles for aging social democratic 
parties is how to engage the progressive, often green-ish urban left, for which 
many political parties (LibDems and Greens in the UK; Liberals, Greens and 
Bloc Québécois in Canada; Grüne in Germany, En Marche in France) are making 
a pitch. What issues (infrastructure? labour market access for millennials? 
recreational drugs?) can win this contest, while at the same time reinforcing a 
social democratic narrative
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HOW TO DIVERSIFY AND REJUVENATE
A related problem is how to make that larger social democratic narrative 
seemingly taken for granted by past generations of voters relevant to new 
voter segments, especially the diverse groups of immigrants and younger 
voters. How can they be mobilised to flock to the polls (like the Obama 
campaign in 2008 managed to do)? How does one rebuild trust in democratic 
institutions without having to bear the burden of defending their failures of 
the past? How did social democrats let the right-wing parties escape from 
that responsibility and continue to be the bearer of bad news (for Europe, for 
free trade, for the UN, etc.)?
HOW NOT TO LOSE THE AGING, WHITE
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While developing new voter basins, we need to learn from mistakes in some 
countries how to not completely abandon our previous core electorate. Many 
new parties, both on the populist left and right, are having a field day with our 
former core constituencies, posing a real electoral threat, especially in the 
context of needing strong regional beachheads within a first-past-the-post 
electoral system.
Here Canada might provide some clues. While losing the 2015 election overall, 
and especially the urban left, younger and diverse voter groups, the federal 
NDP did manage to hold and grow its support in traditional strongholds like 
“rust belt” SW-Ontario, semi-urban Saskatchewan and Vancouver Island 
- three regions that could not be more diﬀerent from one another. Anti-
conservative tactical voter behaviour seems to be one part of the answer,
but regional platforms and branding must also be analyzed to understand
this outcome.
HOW TO BUILD ADAPTABLE, DIGITAL OUTREACH
TOOLS THAT DON’T BREAK THE BANK
Finally, social democratic parties in Europe, Britain and Canada can and should 
learn from another how to update their tactical arsenal of electoral outreach 
and fundraising tools on a small budget. Being dwarfed by the electoral 
budgets of its Southern neighbour, Canadian politics is actually an interesting 
testing ground for American-style, big-data campaigns on a shoestring budget.
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The Labour Party is the oldest political party in Ireland, passing its centenary 
in 2012. Yet it spent just over a fifth of that century in government (McCullagh, 
2012: 107) and currently has only seven members out of 158 in Dáil Eireann (the 
lower house of the Irish parliament). Described as “a slightly odd creature”, it 
was an outlier in post-war Western Europe where “social democracy was an 
immensely influential ideology and social democratic parties were amongst the 
most significant political actors” (Holmes, 2009: 527). 
Its counterpart in Northern Ireland, the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP), is of more recent vintage, dating from 1970. The party was excluded 
from government, except for five months in 1974, until December 1999, when 
the cross-sectarian coalition envisaged by the Belfast agreement of 1998 
was finally established (Wilson, 2010). Suspended on a number of occasions 
since, the post-agreement political institutions collapsed – possibly terminally, 
given the polarising impact of ‘Brexit’ within the region – in February 2017. At 
Westminster, the SDLP’s three seats of 18 allocated to Northern Ireland were 
wiped out in the June 2017 election.
The Irish Labour Party and the SDLP have both suﬀered from path-dependent 
trajectories of long duration, which have condemned them to relative 
marginality over the decades, with no imminent sign of recovery. Labour’s 
greatest ever electoral success, in 2011, still left it with fewer than a quarter 
of Dáil seats. Irish historians usually only consider this in the national context, 
yet it cannot be understood outside a broader European perspective. 
In their insightful analysis of the emergence of the welfare state in western 
Europe, Manow and von Kersbergen (2009) explain how universal welfare 
states in the Nordic countries – the signal victory of twentieth-century 
social democracy in Europe – were achieved by social democrats in alliance 
with agrarian parties, whereas the religious cleavage in continental Europe, 
associated with significant Christian-democrat parties, led to the more 
modest, social-insurance-based alternative. Ireland was not only a prisoner of 
the most intense religious cleavage in western Europe but was also influenced 
by the minimalist, means-tested welfare system which emerged in Britain, 
where the non-proportionate electoral system ensured social democracy was 
mostly excluded from government. 
The 1918 Westminster election tripled the Irish electorate, including through 
giving (some) women the vote. The leader of the by-then principal Catholic 
party, Sinn Féin (SF), insisted that ‘Labour must wait’, and it duly abstained 
from participation then and in the 1921 election, while the Protestant Unionist 
Party romped home in what became Northern Ireland when the island was 
divided along sectarian lines in 1920-22 (Garvin, 2005 [1981]: 131-2). In the 
autonomous, and eventually independent, 26 counties, Labour became 
restricted to episodic participation in government as junior coalition partner 
with one or other of the parties into which SF divided during the 1922-3 civil 
war – with acceptance of, or opposition to, coalition a source of fracture within 
the party (Kennedy et al, 2006: 795), especially in the 1970s and 80s (Purséil, 
2012: 76-9). In the six counties, the Unionist Party held a monopoly of power 
until 1972, having abolished proportional representation and being only briefly 
challenged in Belfast in the early 1960s by the predominantly-Protestant 
Northern Ireland Labour Party.
NARRATIVE AND STRATEGY
In that context, social democracy on the island of Ireland has lacked a 
proud historical record on which to build and to sustain it through diﬃcult 
times. Indeed, any positive political assertion by the Irish Labour Party was 
vulnerable to attacks of ‘godless communism’ from the Catholic authorities, 
stymying a left turn in the 1930s (Ferriter, 2012). The most influential 
period for the party was when it developed a narrative of liberal reformism 
associated with the election of its candidate, Mary Robinson, as president 
(a titular position) in 1990, on a “liberal agenda” of a more secular, inclusive 
society characterised by greater gender equality (Bacik, 2012: 183; McDaid and 
Rekawek, 2010: 632-3). 
Similarly, the SDLP’s finest moments were as an advocate of ‘civil rights’ 
and ‘power-sharing’, as flourished briefly in 1974 and manifested in the 1998 
agreement. But from the early 1970s it was on a path-dependent track 
towards ‘maximalist nationalism’ (McGrattan, 2009), leading ultimately 
towards the embrace of the residue of SF, initially in secret talks, at the 
expense of potential wider solidarities. The latter party – with a ruthless, 
‘democratic centralist’ methodology – gobbled up over time the SDLP’s 
electoral base.
What neither party has ever sought to do is to set out a clear strategy with 
the potential, first of all, to challenge the social conservatism historically 
embedded in such a traditionally religious society, north and south of the 
border – the churches still control schooling, for example, and access to 
abortion is highly restrictive; secondly, to move Irish society on to a more 
egalitarian plane, with a high investment in public goods and universal services 
on the Nordic social model, of which the former leader of the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions, David Begg, was an enthusiast.
Thus, the Labour Party has failed to distinguish itself from the beggar-thy-
neighbour nationalism of Ireland’s low corporation tax and in the 2007 election 
its leader campaigned (unsuccessfully) on a populist ticket of lowering the 
basic rate of income tax. The SDLP, meanwhile, has taken for granted the 
communalist politics of Northern Ireland, ‘designating’ itself as ‘nationalist’ (in 
eﬀect, Catholic) in the region’s assembly when in being, rather than the ‘other’ 
category adopted by the liberal Alliance and the Green Party.
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ORGANISATIONAL STATE OF PLAY
The crisis of social democracy across Europe has been a particularly intense 
manifestation of the wider ‘hollowing out’ of parties, as their role of social 
representation has atrophied (Mair, 2006), given social democracy classically 
sought to give voice to the classes populaires. The Labour Party in Ireland 
follow the British, ‘labourist’ model, emerging from the trade unions in 1912. 
Its initial name was the Irish Trade Union Congress and Labour Party and 
indeed until 1930 it did not allow individual membership (Purséil, 2012: 69). 
In fact until the 1960s it was principally an agrarian-based party, and hence 
comprised a “loose structure of party fiefdoms organised by and centred on 
rural TDs [Dáil members]” (McDaid and Rekawek, 2010: 634). Disaﬃliations 
since the 1950s have left mainly private-sector general unions aﬃliated to the 
party. The SDLP did pick up earlier Labour fragments but it shed its Belfast 
‘Labour’ wing in the 1970s in favour of a more narrowly communalist approach 
(Campbell, 2013).
This has left both parties today as electoral vehicles, rather than parties of 
mass membership. Access to Labour’s membership database based on those 
eligible to vote in the 2002 party leadership election indicated a membership 
of under 3,600 (Kennedy et al, 2006: 795); 2,720 members voted in the party 
leadership election of 2014 (Rafter, 2016: 439). North and south, they have 
been outflanked by the populist zeal of SF in activist recruitment. 
POLICY IDEAS AND ISSUES
There have been significant international trends whose impact on Ireland, 
were they to be absorbed, could lead to a renewal of social democracy 
north and south, were there to be adequate engagement with sister parties 
across Europe. These trends, of globalisation, individualisation and so 
‘cosmopolitanisation’ (Wilson, 2018) have had dramatic impacts, particularly 
in the rapid modernisation of the republic since the election of Robinson, 
including the vertiginous growth of a high-technology economy in the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’ years and the collapse of authority of the Catholic Church through its 
association with various historical scandals of unaccountable institutional 
abuse. 
These have allowed for a social democracy of the twenty-first century to 
emerge, as elsewhere, based on an alliance of the working and professional-
middle classes, prominent female engagement and an appeal to idealistic 
youth and members of minority communities. So, for instance, a 2009 survey 
found that 91 per cent of respondents in the republic agreed that ‘government 
should take active steps to reduce the gap between high and low earners’ 
(TASC, 2010). The gelling narrative for such a politics is ‘the good society’, the 
theme which has been fruitfully explored over the last decade in a European-
wide discussion of the future of social democracy in a series of round tables 
supported by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Meyer and Rutherford, 2012).
As indicated in the introduction to this paper, however, that project is a long 
way from succeeding. Worse, a radical-right populist party (the Democratic 
Unionist Party) and another on its fringes (SF) (Mudde, 2007: 52-5) now 
dominate the dysfunctional politics of Northern Ireland, mired in sectarian 
polarisation, while SF has successfully represented itself as the principal 
alternative to the two principal governing parties in the republic.
AREAS FOR COLLABORATION
In part this inertia has carried forward because of the failure of social 
democrats in Ireland to engage in adequate intellectual reflection on their 
deficits in a broader European context, although membership of the EU from 
1973 led to what one leading Europhile in the party, Barry Desmond, described 
as an opening up of “the isolated political culture and organisation of Labour 
to the policies of the social democratic parties of Europe” (Collins, 2012: 159). 
Adoption of the narrative of the ‘third way’ associated with Britain’s Labour 
leader Tony Blair later followed (Suiter, 2012). 
A hopeful moment was the launch of left-leaning think tanks, in 1995 in the 
north (Democratic Dialogue³) and in 2001 in the south (TASC). These could 
have provided the vehicle for progressive intellectual renewal. But Democratic 
Dialogue found very little traction in Northern Ireland’s toxic political 
environment, outside of the Greens, the short-lived Women’s Coalition and 
the non-sectarian Alliance. And TASC in retrospect pursued a somewhat 
economistic agenda in its early years – when the priority of social democracy is 
always to ensure the social prevails over the economic – although it has flirted 
with the Nordic social model and David Begg was for a time its director.
The enduring values of social democracy – currently facing major political 
headwinds across Europe with the advance of the populists (Wilson, 2018) 
– are liberty, equality and solidarity, as Ania Skrzypek (2011: 57) of the 
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, the think tank linked the Party 
of European Socialists, has argued. Social democracy in Ireland needs to find 
ways to give those values national and local inflections if it is to break out of 
its narrow confines. TASC has developed a useful relationship with FEPS and 
such involvement in wider debates in Europe, particularly in the arena of social 
policy, is key to any break with the well-trodden path of the past.
Specifically, of course, Brexit is a current focus, which brings the whole 
democratic political family in Europe, outside of the far right, together 
with Irish concerns, north and south of the border, including those of social 
democrats. At Westminster it still goes unrecogised that none of the Brexit 
proposals from the major parties is compatible with the invisible Irish border 
the EU demands.
³ I was its founding director from 1995 until its closure in 2006.
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Social democrats in Ireland thus need the support of their counterparts 
across Europe to stand firm against Brexit, or at least any that is more than 
what the British left-wing economist Simon Wren-Lewis calls ‘BINO’ – Brexit 
in name only. The cause of reconciliation in Ireland, a cause with which Europe 
has been identified since the ‘Peace’ programme, demands it.
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7. DENMARK
By Nicolai Wammen
At the turn of the millennium, progressive parties led governments in two-
thirds of the European Union. But the financial crisis became the catalyst of 
a severe electoral and political crises for progressive parties, turning the too 
many of the centre left parties in Europe to mere shadows of their former 
glory. The electoral fall has been swift. Currently, only a handful of European 
countries are lead by progressive governments. And in far too many elections, 
progressive parties are reduced to fractions of their former size.
However, the lessons from Denmark show that while the people may have 
turned their back on the progressive parties, they have not turned their back 
on social democratic values and ideas. Having the will to set aside previous 
thinking and confront the diﬃcult and uncomfortable questions of our time 
have meant that the Social Democratic Party is once again the biggest party 
in Denmark. And that after a steady decline in members since the Second 
World War, membership is now in the rise for three years in a row.
The key has been the realisation that old truths must be challenged if social 
democrats are to answer the questions raised by the troubles and worries 
of ordinary people. That political correctness and previous thinking must not 
stand in the way of new solutions. That for a lot of challenges, international 
cooperation is a big part of the solution, but that social democrats are happy 
to go forward alone if the rest of the international community has not yet 
come to the same conclusions.
THE CASE IN DENMARK
It was John F. Kennedy that said that a rising tide lifts all boats. However, in 
recent years in much of the western world, only the bigger boats have been 
lifted by the tide. The privileged have enjoyed ever-increasing wealth, while 
many ordinary people have a growing insecurity following a financial crisis, an 
influx of immigrants, and the realisation that the benefits of globalisation are 
often easily overlooked outside the urban centres of growth.
In Denmark, these trends have not taken hold with the force of that seen 
in the United States and Great Britain. Danes tend to attribute this to the 
Danish welfare state. An eﬀective market economy, combined with security for 
workers and free and equal access to education and healthcare. However, this 
social contract is under pressure. The number of people losing faith that their 
children will have a better life is on the rise. Just like in many other countries 
this has given rise to parties promoting easy fixes to complex problems.
For the past decade in Denmark, we have seen many Social Democratic voters 
turn towards the Danish People’s Party – most evidently in the parliamentary 
election of 2015, where Denmark became divided into red, blue, and yellow. 
Very broadly speaking, we saw the cities voted for the left. We saw the 
countryside belonged to the right. But the areas disconnected from the 
prosperity, which the rest of the country had witnessed, voted for the Danish 
People’s Party marked by the yellow colour. More than one in five Danes voted 
for the party, giving it the best result in an election ever and making it the 
second largest in parliament. The election also meant a return of the liberal-
conservative government supported by the Danish People’s Party.
However, the election of 2015 also marked a turning point in Danish politics. 
Since the election a change in policy and attitudes of corporation on both 
sides of the usual divide in parliament has lead to a break-up of the traditional 
alliances in Danish politics. The result has been a return of long-lost social 
democratic voters.
WELFARE FIRST
As Denmark has regained its strength after the financial crisis, diﬀerences 
have emerged. A growing regional and economic inequality. Unskilled workers 
see their jobs disappear, while foreigner workers arrive to put wages and 
working conditions under pressure. People with jobs in rural areas cannot get 
approved for a mortgage for a house, the urban population are struggling to 
aﬀord housing at all.
And while our current government seem to conjure up endless schemes to 
lower taxes for the wealthiest, people experience a welfare system running 
on the fumes. Where the elderly cannot get proper care. Where the hospitals 
are overcrowded. Where the kindergarten teacher barely has time to comfort 
a child that fell and scraped its knee. This should not be the case. Denmark 
is too small for big diﬀerences. We needed to bridge the divides and bring 
Denmark back together. That is why the Social Democrats are building their 
platform on the basic message of welfare first.
To regain the trust of the voters the Social Democratic Party needed to be 
better listeners. Too many ordinary people in the parts of Denmark where 
growth has been limited and production jobs have been lost have previously 
felt that the Social Democrats did not take their worries seriously. The Party 
realised that it needed to speak up for the people in the rural parts of the 
country that saw the rest of the country growing and felt left behind due 
centralisation reforms in Denmark and the eﬀects of globalisation.
Moreover, the Social Democrats needed to confront the uncomfortable truth, 
namely that the integration of foreigners in the Danish society for the past 
few decades has been a failure. In a welfare society where the state provides 
a long range of services without cost, it is simply not sustainable to close 
one’s eyes to the real problems of immigration. Likewise the Party has to 
face the growing challenges presented by people in our society that to not 
share the same values, such as free speech, gender equality, LGBTI rights and 
democratic participation.
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It is uncomfortable for some people who associate themselves with the left to 
say that it needs to regain control of the country’s borders. That the Social 
Democratic Party cannot keep up with immigration. That Denmark, together 
with the rest of the EU, needs to stop the flow from Africa and the Middle 
East. That social democracy needed a diﬀerent approach. But it is the truth.
Luckily, the Party’s strong position on immigration issues came at the same 
time as a shift in the Danish People’s Party economic policy. This means 
that new possibilities of corporation have opened up. Where previously the 
Social Democrats were on either side of an argument, now they increasingly 
find themselves aligned against the liberal-conservative government. This, 
despite the fact that the Danish People’s Party still supports the three-party 
liberal-conservative minority government. For instance, the two parties have 
together stopped the government from making big tax cuts for the wealthiest 
paid for by cuts in the Danish welfare state. And the Social Democrats have 
stopped the plans of an increase in retirement age.
This is a huge shift in the usual two-block mentality of Danish politics. Again 
and again, the Social Democrats have worked with Danish People’s Party to 
stop the government’s bad proposals or to point them in a better direction.
ORGANISATIONAL STATE OF PLAY
Since the end of the Second World War membership numbers in the Social 
Democratic Party has been in decline. But since the party introduced 
trial memberships and involved the grassroots in developing a new party 
programme, total membership has been on the rise for three years running.
The new party programme is the fifth in the party’s 147-year history and sets 
the broader principles and working goals of the party. This has invigorated the 
grassroots and helped the party focus on the topics that matter the most to 
our members. For instance, there was was a big desire for a comprehensive 
green policy initiative. So the party made one. Probably the biggest ever made 
in Denmark, again rethinking all connected policy areas, encompassing both 
climate change, research and jobs, energy policies and environmental issues.
The Social Democrats also probably could not have made the big changes 
in their immigration policies without the process. This has meant that the 
members have been aligned with the new course of the party to a much 
greater extent than otherwise expected.
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AND THE GREEN CONVERSION
For a decade the immigration debate has been entrenched between those, 
who do not want to see fundamental changes to their local communities and 
those, who want to throw open the doors and welcome as many as possible. 
The Social Democrats’ conclusion was that neither part had the right answer. 
And that the policies on immigration and integration for the last 30 years have 
been a failure. Instead of trying to fix symptoms, the party wanted to rethink 
the entire approach.
Thus, it has proposed a shift in the Danish policy of immigration. First, it 
suggested a Marshall-plan with the purpose of overcoming the problems 
in notably Africa, which leads to migration. Secondly, it wants to abolish 
spontaneous asylum seeking at the border in favour of reception centres in 
the vicinity of the areas of conflict. Anyone showing up at the Danish borders 
will be taken here. That way Denmark takes away the incentive to risk 
drowning in overcrowded boats in the Mediterranean.
Thirdly the Social Democratic Party wants to regain the control of the number 
of refugees the country can welcome. This will be based on estimations from 
the Danish municipalities on how many they can handle, to make sure that 
Denmark does not again get a generation of un-integrated foreigners living on 
welfare benefits in parallel societies.
A second major policy initiative is on energy, climate change and environment. 
Once again the party set out to rethink the entire subject. Denmark needs 
to reclaim the position as the leading developer of green solutions and 
technology. That is why the Danish Social Democrats set ambitious goals 
in renewable energy, emission reductions and energy saving schemes are 
needed to drive innovation in the Danish companies. The party also wants to 
set up a global foundation to fund research in new green technologies for the 
future and build three new major windmill farms. In terms of the environment, 
Denmark needs a land reform to make sure we have bigger, connected wild 
areas in the country. Denmark need less air pollution and cleaner water.
Thus by combining the four policy-areas of welfare first, fighting inequality, 
a realistic immigration policy, and an ambition of returning Denmark to a 
major green power once again, the Social Democratic Party in Denmark has 
reinforced its core values. It is all about looking out for the everyday working 
people and protecting and developing the welfare state while looking out for 
our planet.
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A FUTURE FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE
People expect answers, social democratic answers. A future for social 
democracy in Europe must revolve around solving the problems concerning 
immigration, climate changes, and implement a European pact of solidarity. 
Most pressing is the question of immigration. Social Democrats need to 
gain control over our borders once again. Europe cannot fulfil the hopes and 
dreams of everyone and as long as there is no control of Europe’s frontier, 
countries will maintain their border control.
Secondly, with Donald Trump’s decision to pull America out of the Paris 
agreement on climate change, Europe must lead the way for more sustainable 
future with cleaner energy. The Social Democratic Party in Denmark wants EU 
countries to be at the front of the green conversion. Social Democrats must 
take the lead in driving the world towards a greener future.
Finally, the Danish Social Democrats advocate a European pact of solidarity. 
In a globalised world, EU is a unique possibility of securing workers’ rights to 
avoid social dumping. And to fight against tax havens and global tax avoidance. 
In other words, we will – and we must – make Europe progressive once again.
FRANCE
WHAT’S LEFT?76 FRANCE 77
8. FRANCE
By Régis Passerieux
(translated by Adrian Pabst)
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SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE
Social-democracy has never really existed in France. To the extent that it has 
been defined as the organisation of a political party seeking to apply a model 
of social justice and the protection of the weakest by relying on parliamentary 
democracy with a social and trade union movement which prepares society 
and the popular forces to be the actors, social-democracy in this sense has 
never taken shape in France.
In fact, very quickly after the First World War, it was ‘radicalism’ (in the 
French meaning), or at least the mutualist centre-left wing of ‘radicalism’, 
that dominated as the representation of the new industrial classes. After 
its demise, with the collapse of the Third Republic in 1940, the Socialist 
Party very quickly took the form of a renewed expression of this traditional 
radicalism. In a way, François Hollande, by his very personality, is the perfect 
achievement, the pure model of this. There are only two historical exceptions 
of the Socialist Party (Parti socialiste or PS) to this continuity. On the one 
hand, the Popular Front, which is some manner the initial moment when the 
Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO – the French section of 
the Workers’ International) is still the heir, a few years after the congress of 
Tours, of the workers’ movement and relies on a real popular base. 
On the other hand, the period that goes from the conquest of the Socialist 
Party by François Mitterrand in 1971 to the ‘pause’, the change in economic 
policy towards austerity decided in 1983 under the pressure of an ‘external 
constraint’ (the policy of the Franc fort to keep pace with the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism). Although the absence of strong ties with workers 
and trade unions does not really make it possible to speak of social democracy 
in the strict sense of the term, there was however the will to seek a social-
democratic settlement and to translate it into political action during these 
two periods.
Since then, the French Socialist Party – under the pressure of globalisation 
but also out of a desire for coexistence with the economic and institutional 
forces structuring the country – has accepted its transformation into a 
‘radical progressive party’ that it had begun during the Fourth Republic. In a 
sense, we can say that the Socialist Party is in an implicit way the heir of the 
social wing of the Radical Party, the ‘solidarism’ of Leon Bourgeois. Meanwhile, 
the French centre-right is the heir of the Radical Party’s wing that was always 
more concerned with the more aﬄuent classes. Therefore, to find its identity, 
the Socialist Party had to change its outlook, having neither the courage 
nor the support to forge a new economic and social model consistent with 
the ideals of the National Council of Resistance. It first found it in the idea of  
accelerated European integration, claiming that the European project was a 
protection against globalisation and then – when it needed a national project 
faced with the limits of this transfer of power – the PS found it in a societal 
project which changed progressivism into a promotion of unlimited individual 
rights.
THE EXISTENTIAL CRISIS OF
THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY
As a result, the French Socialist Party has been caught several times in 
an impasse: faced with mass unemployment and inequalities that follow 
from globalisation and market competition, the Party accepted a growing 
precariousness of French society that it only compensated for by puncturing 
the middle classes in order to redistribute social benefits to those classes ‘left 
behind’. All this time, the PS failed to question the foundations of the capitalist 
system without barrier or border since the fall of the USSR and the triumph 
of monetarism promoted by the Anglo-Saxon powers. Since then the Party 
has logically retreated into the major metropolitan urban centres anchored 
in the processes of globalisation and the upper social classes. This has meant 
abandoning the fragile, precarious territories of the small cities and towns, as 
well as the suburban and rural communities that voted No in the referendums 
on the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and the Constitutional Treaty in 2005.
From this point of view, the acceptance of the Treaty of Amsterdam by the 
new socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin just after coming to power in June 
1997 – when he had in his election manifesto committed himself and his Party 
to introducing criteria of social and political convergence in parallel with 
the criteria of economic and budgetary convergence – marks the definitive 
abandonment of an ability to analyse the failure of 1993 (when the PS was 
routed in the parliamentary elections) and the failure to develop a critical 
positioning vis-à-vis the European project. 
The opposition to Tony Blair within the Socialist International and the Party 
of European Socialists in the European Parliament is merely a pretext for 
the lack of clear political line in Jospin’s government: Blair’s commitment to 
capitalism was such a caricature that it enabled the PS to look like it was 
to the left of the Labour Party while in reality being just as compliant and 
complicit with the dominant system. Since then the Socialist Party has had 
only one strategy: returning to power as the only party that can oﬀer an 
alternative and to do so mechanically whenever the right is exhausted (as in 
2012) and to establish a form of local power that is based on clientelism and 
support from the professional classes.
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NARRATIVE AND REALITY
The narrative of the French Socialist Party then becomes that of a modern 
party, composed of competent and experienced leaders, turned towards the 
future, eﬃcient, enlightened and providing new rights: a party of modernism. 
Sociologically, behind this façade, it becomes the party that allows the 
social progress of a whole layer of professionals of politics, without real 
values, without any vision of society – ‘young wolves’ recruited by local party 
associations to whom the status of the PS as an institutional party guarantees 
a clear career progression. The absence of a social-democratic tradition 
linking the party to industrial trade unions contributed more than elsewhere 
in Europe to transforming it into a party without roots, and prepared the 
ground, after brief recoveries, for the eventual defeats. 
Beginning under the leadership of François Hollande, the professionalisation 
and lack of internal reflection within the Socialist Party has led to make it a 
party composed of a sum of electoral ambitions, presidential at the top and 
municipal at the bottom. Today the PS is totally devoid of any values and 
its leaders are culturally and genetically incapable of transmitting vision or 
experience and without any intellectual thinking. As the Dorian Gray of French 
politics, the Socialist Party is today in France fully identified by public opinion 
for what it is truly in reality: a substitute of the pre-war Radical Party. It is a 
party of opportunism that is cynical while being clothed in the garb of good 
intentions.
With the illusion no longer working, it was normal that – as the Socialist Party 
headed for an foretold collapse in the 2017 elections – the most ambitious 
among the ‘professionals’ who compose the PS would support a candidate who 
had fully embraced a modern liberal-libertarian model: Emmanuel Macron. 
No turning back appears possible in a reasonable way because no source 
of renewal, no link with organisations that are connected with workers, 
employees or the social movements which are powerful on the ground oﬀer 
any possibility of revival. The Socialist Party is now condemned to live that 
which the party it inherited once lived – the Radical Party: accommodate the 
few remaining voters and stagnate at between 4% and 7% of an electorate 
which is now reduced to those who are faithful out of nostalgia and those in 
live in some France’s major metropolitan areas.
KEY QUESTIONS FOR FRENCH POLITICS,
INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT
Now a number of key questions and ideas are no longer represented in French 
society by any political party: the choice of a break with financial capitalism; 
the defence of disadvantaged social classes and areas; the defence of the value 
of work as a value of integration and progress; the defence of neighbourhood 
solidarity; the preservation, renovation, and modernisation of a mutualist 
economy and co-determination in the management of social security; 
encouraging social dialogue through an engagement between employers and 
trade unions; the creation of an economic and social model which gives a share 
to all in the common work of value creation. All these needs are pre-empted by 
protest parties that turn into an anaemic and infertile revolutionary utopia all 
those popular expectations that should be very concretely addressed and met 
by a social-democratic party with a moral compass: such a compass means 
that when politics deny the real, the bill is always paid by the most fragile parts 
of the population.
The current EU Commissioner in charge of the economy Pierre Mosovici who 
was finance minister under President Holland is emblematic of what the PS 
has been in the last 20 years. The most recent social-democratic Chancellor of 
Germany became a businessperson employed by Gazprom. The last president 
of the Socialist International, before it collapsed, represented in public opinion, 
as prime minister, the submission of his country, Greece, to the manipulations 
of international finance. The last great eﬀective leaders of the most 
emblematic institutions of the new world order – NATO, the IMF, and the WTO 
– were great personalities of socialism, including two Frenchmen (Pascal Lamy 
and Dominic Strauss-Kahn). So how can we imagine an eﬀective collaboration 
that makes sense between social- democratic parties in Europe and even 
more so in the world in a realistic way? Public opinion cannot be fooled: it 
has analysed and understood what has happened and it is not prepared to 
embrace a new internationalism that has no genuine foundation in the lived 
experience of people’s everyday life.
It is therefore necessary – for those who want to defend society and build an 
intelligent and sustainable alliance between the abandoned working classes 
and weak middle classes – to go beyond words and to recreate a political 
method and a political project, which encompasses the social and democracy 
but by getting rid of the now-worn label ‘social-democracy’. It is clear, 
especially in Europe (which has a special role to play in inventing and promoting 
a new economic model based on an economy of reciprocity) that this work 
cannot be done in one country alone but must be done in a concerted and 
connected manner. 
At the centre of the common reflection there are some key themes that 
constitute priorities: first of all, another conception of the company, less 
financial and more democratic; second, the defence of work as a common 
endeavour to which everyone has the right and the duty to contribute; third, 
the definition of an economic model that does not sacrifice land, society, 
human relations and the social link to consumption and commodification; 
fourth, the definition of a fair and reasonable distribution of income between 
generations, areas of a country and producers; fifth, defending the values  of 
free association and mutual support in a responsible and non-consumerist 
conception of citizenship. In all these fields, there is a place for a political 
movement that reaﬃrms itself as a defender of values  while being realistic. 
The question is: can it call itself ‘social-democratic’ when the label has become 
synonymous with moral bankruptcy and the betrayal of traditional working-
class and other supporters?
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COOPERATION ACROSS EUROPE
Therefore, the priority cooperation between national political forces or 
governments that maintain the will to establish a fruitful link between society, 
the economy and politics must focus on the essential: (1) to defend a new 
economic and social model and a new conception of the company, built on new 
rules that involve in the production decision all the stakeholders who are the 
co-owners of the company, the ecosystem that surrounds it, its employees, 
the land in which it’s rooted; (2) to define rules that prevent the economic and 
financial system from developing for the benefit of small, vested interests – to 
the detriment of ecology, social ties, social equilibrium and values; (3) to make 
Europe a place where we can discuss this economic and social model and finally 
build it together, not with the sole concern of allowing the exchange of goods 
and services, but with the concern of how to produce and preserve; (4) to 
propose a model of international society that is not based exclusively on the 
economic or military balance of power from power to power but which draws 
lessons from the failures of the twentieth century.
If it is necessary to renew Europe, it is clear now that it is not on legal rules, 
or even on only institutional rules that this project can be built but, by a 
real debate about the creation of a new economic and social model adapted 
to a context of a radically open and changing society around information 
technology. As the concentration of capital yesterday has allowed eﬀects of 
domination, this technology will lead either to predation or, on the contrary, to 
an improvement in living conditions, depending on the manner, intelligence and 
determination with which politics takes it. Old social democracy died alongside 
the old industrial age.
PORTUGAL
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9. PORTUGAL
By Joana Ramiro
It was one of those autumn nights when it starts getting chilly outside, streets 
go from green to auburn, and the rain leaves behind a smell of childhood 
comforts. I was in a rush, running late to where I needed to be, which on 4th 
October 2015 was the electoral results party of the Portuguese Bloco de 
Esquerda (Left Bloc), at Lisbon’s São Jorge cinema. So I took a cab.
 
Cabs, I find, are the best way to know what is going through Portuguese 
consciousness. And even what is going on in Portuguese parliament. Which 
policies are having the biggest impact, which parties and politicians are leaving 
a mark. Because cab drivers in Lisbon drive all sorts of people around and are 
always up for a chat. And because, like cab drivers everywhere, they are not 
shy of sharing their opinion and that of those they have driven. Cab drivers, 
hairdressers and cafe waiters are the barometers of Portuguese society. And 
when in doubt, it is this holy trinity I consult. But more on this later.
 
What I did not know on 4th October 2015, even after seeing Bloco surge in 
the exit polls against all odds, even after watching friends become members 
of parliament and the conservative coalition lose its majority, was that the 
Portuguese paradigm was to become a riddle and a pharos to political analysts 
for years to come.
 
And even if I had foreseen that the harshest round of austerity measures was 
to end with the rise of the so-called geringonça (the contraption – a derogative 
moniker for the governmental agreement between the Socialist Party and the 
far-left in the form of Bloco, the Portuguese Communist Party - PCP, and the 
Greens), I would never have guessed that this new government would pose so 
many questions on the nature of social democracy in the 21st century.
 
All I knew in October 2015 was that Portugal, like many of its southern 
European brethren nations, was aﬄicted by austerity, unemployment, 
crumbling social infrastructures, social unrest, mass emigration, widespread 
discontent and a slight taste of panic. The Socialist Party (PS), which is part of 
the Socialist International, was floundering - both on members on the ground, 
as on political rhetoric. The infamous demise of its Greek counterpart, PASOK, 
still fresh. Conservative Catholics seemed to be doing just fine, piggybacking 
on the centre-right (and inaptly named) Social Democratic Party (PSD).
 
So what turned the Socialists’ fate around? And what does it mean to 
international social democracy? And does it really hail the dawn of a new, 
prosperous era for the nations of Europe?
“In the post-crisis context that aﬀected Portugal, Europe, and the world, 
where cuts were imposed on wages and public services, where household 
incomes and investment fell, where half a million people - in their majority 
qualified young people - emigrated, we had a huge and challenging path to 
take,” PS national director Mariana Vieira da Silva told me recently. “The path 
was to build an alternative to the austerity policy defended by the right.”
 
She added that “it was therefore necessary to give people back their social 
rights, reverse the cuts imposed by the years of austerity, and also give 
them back their trust in a future of growth and sustainable development.” 
To reverse this “negative cycle”, she added, “it was possible to find common 
ground with the other parties of the parliamentary left, and we established 
our joint positions in three historic agreements.”
 
That’s the inception of geringonça. And the agreements Vieira da Silva 
refers to could be seen as both the three budgets agreed by the Portuguese 
parliament this far, but also, in short, the PS’ three promises to its far-left 
partners: to unfreeze pensions, reform a series of taxes which burdened 
families far more than corporations, and to stop the rampant privatisation of 
public services that took place in the preceding years.
 
And to the naked eye, these agreements were, overall, respected. The 
Portuguese economy seems, at a first glance, to be doing better than it was 
before, and the pace of its recovery is, allegedly, faster than that of Greece or 
Spain. But walking through the streets of the Portuguese capital one would 
not exactly think of this country as a shiny example of European aﬄuence. 
Rather, it strikes you as the new “hot tourist destination”. And, indeed, that 
is one of the things that helped create the mirage that is the Portuguese 
economic recovery. Last year, a record 20 million foreigners visited the 
10 billion-strong country. And according to recent figures by the Bank of 
Portugal, they left behind a whopping €41.5 million a day. Yes, you read that 
correctly - a day.
For the average Portuguese person, however, not much has changed. There 
are more jobs around, but few under stable contracts. Under European diktats 
many public companies continue to reduce their senior and higher paid staﬀ 
(through early retirement or volunteer redundancy packages), precarious and 
seasonal employment is on a high, and, as I known first hand, vital sectors such 
a journalism are a dying breed.
 
And it was fellow journalist and Lisbon resident Ricardo Cabral Fernandes, who 
explained to me how the PS government left turn was nothing but a coup of 
political genius.
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“The geringonça was basically an exclusively tactical turn of the Socialist 
Party.” We are in a downtown cafe in Lisbon and it’s late on a summer 
afternoon. I’ve come from the beach, sun-kissed, sandy feet - the stereotype 
of the healthy, relaxed Mediterranean living. Except that I am a Lisboner who 
doesn’t live in Lisbon. I live in London. My colleague, who works six days a week 
for two of Portugal’s biggest publications and manages an entire foreign desk 
with one other person, looks exhausted. His voice has that bittersweet timbre 
of someone who was once bitter but who can’t even aﬀord that any longer.
 
“What happened was that the, so-to-speak, socialist/left wing of PS very 
quickly learnt the lessons of PASOK in Greece. So it turned its compass. 
And (Prime Minister) António Costa was that compass. Yes, he broke the 
governance arc, made a parliamentary alliance with the Bloco and the PCP, but 
for all else, in policy terms, it keeps the same politics.”
 
What PS was able to do, he argues, was to radically change the way in which 
voters understood the Socialist Party. While it was once attacked both by the 
right as by the far-left, with the geringonça PS created itself some space to 
grow with the blessing of, or at least a ceasefire from, Bloco and PCP.
 
As part of that strategy was a strong message from PS arguing that, after all, 
austerity was not as inevitable as it had once been agreed. “After almost three 
years, we are in a position to say that our policies worked and that PS knew 
how to aﬃrm a real alternative to those who said that it did not exist,” said 
Vieira da Silva. Where that leaves PS’ one-time support for the Troika (read, 
the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International 
Monetary Fund - IMF) memorandum, no one is quite sure. All water under the 
bridge, I guess.
 
“The Socialist Party is an example of the possibility of building an alternative 
without breaking with European commitments,” she insists. “We have shown 
that, even under a diﬀerent policy, it is possible to build a more equal country, 
with more and better jobs, and enjoy the highest economic growth since 
joining the Euro. All under the same rules that apply to other countries in the 
European Union.” She adds: “It was with this policy that we scrapped excessive 
deficit and reached its historic low levels. That is why Portugal today has a 
solid economy and public finances.”
 
And yet, public investment in Portugal is the lowest of all advanced economies, 
according to the IMF. Promises to improve this record have come to little 
action on the ground. Public services such as the transport networks and the 
national health service are in acute crisis, and teachers have declared war on 
the government over missed salary increases.
 
The country’s industries too have not changed much between 2015 and the 
time of writing. Other than tourism, of course, and much of that is controlled 
by foreign investment, particularly from China. Other grand investments 
in Portuguese infrastructure have been by Spanish, Brazilian, and US 
corporations. In other words, little public revenue is to be expected from them 
in the coming years.
 
There is, however, an argument to be made about the realpolitik behind 
the geringonça. While it is not without its contradictions, the geringonça as 
a government that has not implemented austerity but is not openly anti-
austerity either, has allowed Portugal to do things the Troika did not allow 
Greece to do.
Cabral Fernandes is in no doubt that the European Union would have fallen on 
Portugal - like it did on Greece in the early days of the Syriza government - had 
the geringonça turned out to be a more radical government, ready to talk debt 
restructuring or renationalisation of public services.
 
“The dogmas of the European Union continue, in Greece and everywhere else,” 
said Cabral Fernandes.
 
And the strategy of mollifying the “good student of Europe” and use it as 
prime example of how “austerity doesn’t work, but really, it clearly did” is 
working.
 
“It was this policy that allowed a better life for the Portuguese and gave them 
back the confidence they had lost in the institutions, the European Union 
and democracy in general,” echoed the national director of the Socialist 
Party. “According to the latest Eurobarometer, 75% of Portuguese people 
are satisfied with democracy in Portugal, which contrasts with 15% in 2013. 
Confidence in the government, parliament, and European institutions has also 
been on the rise since we formed a government.”
 
This, she believes, has also thwarted the “populist, nationalist and 
destabilising projects” that have grown across Europe. “These narratives did 
not grow in Portugal because we believe that the core of the government’s 
policies must be trust. The Portuguese feel that they have returned or are 
returning to normality. By giving them security and hope in the future, we are 
simultaneously fighting the threat of populism.”
 
And my trusted barometer agreed with her. On my way back home from 
meeting Cabral Fernandes I took a cab. And the conversation, by chance, fell 
again on the topic of geringonça. My driver was a middle-aged man named Tó 
Vieira, and he promptly tells me that “there are only two real politicians in 
Portugal”. One is António Costa.
 
He felt things were slowly turning around, yet not for everyone. Of his two 
children one is abroad. He’s doing well, but he isn’t home. The other is unsure 
about the probabilities of finding a job after graduating.
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Most importantly, however, he told me he used to be a PS militant. “I was a 
member of the Socialist Party in the time of Lopes Cardoso and of Salgado 
Zenha, but when they left, I left,” he said in a kind of jolly resignation. António 
Lopes Cardoso and Francisco Salgado Zenha were two heroes of the 
Portuguese revolution, founders of the Socialist Party, and members of its 
more left-wing ranks. Both abandoned the party when its socialist essence 
turned into the social democratic nature it has adopted to this day.
 
For many Portuguese like Mr Vieira, certainly for those who supported it in 
the early years of the new, democratic Portugal, PS went from being a party 
of transformation and hope to being a party of the status quo and ‘jobs for 
the boys’. But since the geringonça there’s a new-born hope. Not necessarily 
hope for a better life, as Vieira da Silva suggested, but hope that things in São 
Bento (read the Portuguese political establishment) are moving in a diﬀerent 
direction.
And that is perhaps the strongest lesson of the geringonça - both to the 
Socialist Party and to political analysts fascinated with its anachronistic 
revival in the polls. In a time when its sister parties in Germany and France are 
polling at 20.5% and 6.4% respectively, PS has consistently polled around 40% 
since its left turn. The only other case of a social democratic party succeeding 
in these terms is that of the British Labour Party. There too, albeit under 
diﬀerent circumstances, a sharp turn from social democracy to democratic 
socialism has taken place. 
In the past decade social democratic parties, defending minor reforms, often 
promoting policies such as “austerity light”, or shrouding privatisations in PR 
language and calling them public-private partnerships, became meaningless 
to an electorate eager for a new system. New parties with smaller support 
bases started mushrooming across Europe, calling not for ethical capitalism, 
but for the end of capitalism. And as the socio-economic situation worsened, 
so did these movements become bigger - as we saw with the birth of Syriza in 
Greece and Podemos in Spain. Minor reforms were shunned in favour of bolder 
political promises, including reverting many of the policies implemented by the 
last generation of social democrats. Indeed, pledges that many critics pointed 
out to be not revolutionary but regressive in essence. A de facto return to the 
well-nurtured welfare state of the post-war period.  
And like Syriza and Podemos, so too did PS and the Labour Party succeed 
once more in appealing to the electorate by turning left and oﬀering a 
socialism that, more than utopic, is ultimately nostalgic. In fact, PS and Labour 
benefitted from the fact that they had a longer history, a firm structure, and 
the resources to do more and reach further than the new movements. And by 
resources I don’t mean just in terms of donations, or volunteer door-knockers 
and leafleteers, but also in connections and relationships with the rest of their 
national and the international establishments. 
There are however great diﬀerences between PS and Labour, the way they’ve 
revived “social democracy”, the way the establishment reacts to them and how 
it will influence their respective futures. 
For starters, the Portuguese party’s numbers on the ground - its militants, 
its membership - are nowhere close to swelling like Labour’s. In other words, 
the support for PS is premised on its performance as a government - it’s 
parliamentarian. While it navigates the pressures placed by its far-left 
partners, it must deliver for the electorate and yield palpable results so to 
guarantee its grip on power. Its left turn is not ideological but tactical. For 
that reason too, the reaction of mainstream media and financial institutions 
to its government have ranged from miﬀed to lenient, rather than violent 
hostility. 
Labour did nearly the exact opposite. It started a shift at its very core for 
the heart and soul of the party. It is led by people who believe in the political 
turn as the ideological path to follow, rather than the useful step ahead. And 
while both are allowed in the political game, it would seem the former is of a 
long-lasting nature considering the political positions taken by the younger 
generations, read Millennials and Generation Z. 
Indeed, the lesson of the new smaller parties, of Bloco and of Podemos, 
and even of Syriza, is that political organisations without a serious work 
of ideological base-building, without institutionalisation, not in terms of 
parliamentary politics but in terms of crystallising its internal structures, 
don’t survive the whims of capitalism. Because capital is capable and willing 
to accommodate for its survival, as long as it needs, until it rears its ugly 
head again at the nearest opportunity. But this, rather than delivering a new 
system, perpetuates an existing cycle that won’t end unless we will it so. Yet 
the future requires we must, if there is to be one at all. 
To beat climate change and violent xenophobia, to extend international 
solidarity and resolve conflict, to eradicate poverty and bring abundance, 
the Socialist Party, as Mariana Vieira da Silva pointed out, must cooperate 
internationally. But in a polarised world the choices of whom to work with 
to achieve these goals are dwindling. So it is undoubtedly essential that the 
Socialist Party holds hands with and learns from the Labour Party, while 
encouraging other social democratic parties to open their arms to democratic 
socialism and its supporters. 
Only thus, can the Socialist Party, and Portuguese paradigm by extension, go 
from being a political conundrum, a geringonça, to being the future of Europe. 
In a global world like the one we live in, only international collaboration 
guarantees the solidity and innovation of a political project. Therefore, the 
PS focuses on international relations, with particular commitment at the 
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European level. It is at European level that we can best address the main 
challenges we face: migration, the response to financial crises, climate change 
or the challenges of the digital economy. All these challenges are better 
answered in the EU than outside the EU.
In this context, social democratic and progressive parties must emerge 
as promoters of community values  and be able to combine them with the 
progressivism of their political genesis, taking advantage of this impetus to 
emerge as structures capable of facing and adapting to the challenges of the 
future. The PS is aware of these challenges and, in addition to continuously 
identifying them, it has oﬀered solutions which, with the help of our European 
sister parties, will provide the EU with the necessary instruments to 
overcome. 
THE UK
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OVERVIEW
On 23 February 2017, campaigners watched in shock as the northwest England 
seat of Copeland slipped into Conservative hands for the first time in living 
memory. Disagreement simmered as to whether the defeat had long or short-
term causes, but whatever one’s take, it was a grim winter. 
The summer changed everything. While Labour did not take power in 2017’s 
election, it moved into Conservative heartlands, deprived the government 
of their majority and defied the expectations of virtually every political 
commentator. Labour continues to poll reliably level with the Conservatives, 
putting Jeremy Corbyn within striking distance of Downing Street.
Labour’s programme tapped into a prevailing frustration with politics; 
Edelman’s trust barometer shows a consistent and stratospheric lack of 
confidence in public institutions more broadly. Various shocks – from MPs’ 
expenses to phone hacking – have undermined faith in Britain’s establishment, 
but ultimately people’s disillusionment has material causes. The interests 
of finance capital direct our economy while regional and industrial bases 
have been eroded. In-work poverty has surged to record levels. A housing 
crisis blights the capital and is spreading. Austerity has failed to stabilise the 
economy, and has seen schools, hospitals, policing, and vital services across 
the board struggling to survive (Quieter work like the teaching unions’ school 
cuts campaign paid dividends during the election.) Worsening prospects 
in working life propelled Labour’s surge among the 25-44s; which was 
considerably greater than the more publicised ‘youthquake’. 
Popular discontent found another outlet – Brexit. While the demand for a 
referendum was pushed from the fringes, once on the table is served as a 
lightning rod for frustrations on a cocktail of issues. New, powerful political 
tribes remain on both sides, even if stories about Brexit identity trumping 
party aﬃliation proved overblown at the election. The precise picture of public 
attitudes on Brexit now is uncertain, but we can conclude that the government 
is not trusted to negotiate and substantial minorities are pushing for either a 
hard exit or none.
Labour and the Conservatives swept up an unprecedented 80+% of the vote 
between them; polarising forces that have fractured mainstream parties 
elsewhere have strengthened them here. Meanwhile the current government 
has shed half a dozen cabinet ministers in the last few months, and another 
election remains possible. Uncertainty notwithstanding, Labour’s strong 
position and mass membership will be the envy of many parties across the 
international left. 
10. THE UK
10.1. The Labour Party as seen
by a member of Momentum 
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AND WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE AND HOW?
On 15 June 2015, backbench MP John McDonnell sat outside the Labour oﬃce 
in Parliament on his knees. Minutes before the deadline, he was pleading 
tearfully with colleagues for the final nominations needed to put his lifelong 
friend and ally, Jeremy Corbyn, on the shortlist for Labour’s leadership. 
Corbyn entered the race with 200-1 odds against him. His shock win posed 
immediate questions - how to organise hundreds of thousands of new 
members; how to negotiate the roles of diﬀerent institutions within the party; 
and how to renew a party that had recently suﬀered a bruising election defeat.
Labour’s strategy is to ensure ‘our hugely expanded membership becomes 
a mass movement which can transform society’. It’s what can be expected 
of a grassroots leadership that cut their teeth on picket lines and protests. 
Questions of how structures can make this approach eﬀective are central. 
Do members feel they have a role in shaping their party? Are party units – 
liberation groups, local and regional groups, youth and students – properly 
resourced? Are they accessible and appealing places to be for people whom 
politics is one of many competing priorities? Labour’s ongoing Democracy 
Review took somewhere in the region of 11,000 submissions and is shaping 
them into proposals. Outside its ambit, full-bodied debates are in progress on 
ideas for party renewal; for instance the proposal to hold US-style primaries 
for candidates.
Pro-Corbyn campaign group, Momentum, has acted as an innovation lab for 
new techniques. Their experiments, which include a phone-banking app or 
carpool planning and digital tools for potential canvassers to locate their 
nearest marginal seat, have been replicated by the party. In the industrial 
sphere, Labour campaigners have helped boost the profile of groundbreaking 
strikes in the gig economy, such as at McDonald’s or among public sector 
cleaners – though there is more work to be done on labour movement 
collaboration. Momentum have imported US field organisers to teach 
persuasion techniques to canvassers, and deployed its press oﬃce to help 
activists sell stories to newspapers. Several dozen staﬀ have been recruited 
to a new “community organising unit” which will equip local parties to become 
active forces in civic life outside of election time. 
Though uneven, there is evidence of an intellectual revival, such as widely 
attended discussion workshops (including one attended by 400 in Derby.) 
Trade unions, thinktanks, and other parts of the British left’s ecosystem are 
also taking part. Meanwhile a cultural revival is being attempted – from youth 
football leagues to disco nights. There are larger scale experiments such as 
The World Transformed, an ideas festival held alongside party conference. 
The party’s impressive performance on social media – both from politicians, 
and grassroots eﬀorts which reach millions – is also worth noting. While 
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incomplete, there have been remarkable strides in the project to recruit and 
develop members, and establish Labour’s presence locally as a transformative 
movement. 
PARTY NARRATIVE AND STRATEGY
In the coastal seat of Brighton Kemptown in June 2017 the streets heaved with 
canvassers. Organisers repeatedly reported having too many people. A local 
pub oﬀered free pints for Labour’s campaigners. An entire street put posters 
in their windows. Days later, Labour gained the seat. 
Labour’s medium now plays a key role in its message. Its investment in 
personal political communication by using a mass membership to reach 
voters directly helps tell a broader story about empowerment and 
democratic control. It also builds trust – in the age of overwhelming streams 
of information, people are retreating toward relying on word of mouth for 
reliable information.
Activists often say their most valuable tool in the 2017 general election was 
Labour’s manifesto. It was the first mass-circulation document seen in British 
politics in decades, amassing hundreds of thousands of downloads within days. 
It provided both a coherent vision and an accessible resource for campaigners. 
The manifesto helped anchor the wider story that Labour is telling, which 
has shifted gradually towards according people more agency; from ensuring 
that ‘no community is left behind’ to ensuring that no-one is ‘held back’ by 
the Conservative government. The account oﬀered by Labour is; people’s 
potential is being held back by a government that have made a specific set of 
choices – to cut rather than to invest, to manage decline rather than renew, 
and to redistribute to the wealthiest rather than the poorest – because they 
continue to represent the interests of the most privileged. Labour will use 
state power strategically to foster greater popular power over the economy 
and society in order to ensure that people and communities have both the 
bedrock of strong public services and access to a fairer economy in which they 
can fulfil their potential. Or put simply, a society run for the many, not the few. 
In policy terms, the many and the few were identified in numerous examples, 
such as money to be taken from private schools’ VAT to fund free school meals 
for all.
Tying this together is the leadership. The 2017 election was framed by the 
Conservatives as a referendum on individuals - strong and stable Theresa May 
versus weak Corbyn’s coalition of chaos. As it transpired, the election became 
both a referendum on policy and a vindication of Corbyn’s personality. In spite 
of ferocious media criticism, he retained the air homespun honesty that clings 
to him on account of decades in the relative political wilderness fighting for 
principled causes. This alongside his personal eccentricity and charm formed 
an anti-establishment pitch that was warm and caring rather than aggressive. 
This story now needs to be broadened and adapted to take new events and 
hitherto unreached groups into account. The mass-membership is useful here; 
strategists have a larger sample size, and a clear conduit through which to 
assess what is working on the ground, and what is not. A larger party is also 
a more socially-representative one, and Labour will need to work to recruit 
messengers and spokespeople who reflect the communities they want to 
reach.
KEY POLICY IDEAS AND ISSUES
Copeland, where the by-election was lost, is both politically and geographically 
isolated. Locked in by a mountain range, a single unelectrified train line 
connects the area to the rest of the world. On the same day there was a 
by-election in Stoke, several hundred miles away. The area once exported 
ceramics to the world. Now around 17,000 families are struggling to aﬀord to 
heat their homes.
Labour’s agenda sets out not just to address deprivation but to rebuild and 
transform communities like these permanently. It does so according to a 
number of key principles; considerable state capital expenditure in order to 
kickstart growth and rebalance the economy; taxing the top tier to fund public 
services; placing key natural monopolies in public hands; and fostering new 
individual and collective working rights. While not original, these prescriptions 
would be a radical departure from an extended period of neoliberal orthodoxy; 
and the growing conversation about democratic control rather than 
mere state control (for instance proposals for ballots on housing estate 
regenerations) allows the programme’s frontiers to be extended. 
Support for the domestic agenda is gaining ground – how could it not be with 
police stations closing, hospitals losing beds, working people dependent on 
food banks and children’s services in tatters? Yet Labour still has work to do 
to explain its plans to voters, and demonstrate its will and ability to deliver. 
For all the noise both Corbynism and its detractors make about Labour’s 
radicalism, they will still be viewed as the ‘same old politicians’ by many 
undecided voters. 
Beyond economic policy there are a number of fine balances to make. 
Squaring the Labour leadership’s longstanding opposition to overseas military 
intervention with a robust defence and security strategy is one. Another 
example of a complex tightrope is migration; polling shows growing favourable 
attitudes towards immigration and events like the Windrush fiasco have 
dented people’s faith in the system, but opposition remains fierce. Devising 
and communicating a system which is fairer and more humane than the 
current one whilst taking on public hostility is conceivable, but proofing it 
against the divide-and-rule tactics of the right is a trying task. 
A semi-related balancing act is Brexit – whilst reversing it or crashing out 
with no deal are not popular options, a middle-ground approach will inflame 
hardliners at both ends. The government are floundering through a process 
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which is constantly in flux, public attitudes are also in flux and a parliamentary 
logjam seems likely. In these circumstances any government-in-waiting needs 
to retain a degree of flexibility. But beyond obscure procedural questions, 
the Brexit debate is often one about what kind of country we want to live in. 
Labour will hope that its answer to that question can unite not just Leavers 
and Remainers, but diﬀerent sections of an increasingly fractured place.
ISSUES AND AREAS IN WHICH COLLABORATION
BETWEEN COUNTRIES FEELS ESSENTIAL
At the other end of the continent, survivors of war languish on beaches if 
they are fortunate enough to have survived crossing the Mediterranean. The 
EU manages public discontent by outsourcing the refugee crisis to brutal 
authorities in Libya and Turkey. This is one urgent, clear example of where 
collaboration across the European left to develop a better settlement is 
critical. Nor is it an isolated issue; a party cannot think about how to mobilise 
popular support for refugee protection without thinking concurrently about 
how to address people’s economic worries. 
There are broad, common themes facing Western politics. A resurgent 
right gains ground in disconnected communities. Centrists struggle to 
maintain the status quo. In the political and cultural clashes over liberalism 
and globalisation, the left has struggled to maintain a toehold. Centrist 
social democrats from Hollande to Papandreou have been put to pasture 
while radical social democrats from Tsipras to Iglesias have either failed to 
break through or been neutralised in power. Sharing the lessons of these 
experiences is essential. 
The European left has common adversaries. Predatory multinationals will 
evade tax in one country and exploit workers in another, and cooperation 
is necessary to restrain them. Cross-border collaboration can also square 
the circle of making some degree of protectionism compatible with 
internationalism. For instance, Labour’s ‘Build it in Britain’ drive to redevelop 
our manufacturing base and favour domestic contractors for key services 
can reduce our reliance on exploitative labour conditions overseas and can 
be accompanied by increased scrutiny of our own firms’ overseas activities. 
How global trading power is used for social good (particularly in relation to 
developing countries which are all too often exploited by richer economies) is 
also a collective question. The list of global challenges goes on; belligerence 
on the international stage from Trump and Putin; terrorism; automation; 
resource scarcity; and the looming presence of climate change and other 
forms of environmental degradation. Solutions made stronger by collaboration 
will be both more eﬀective in practice and more electorally credible.
Our polarised, febrile environment that presents both dangers and 
opportunities. Solidarity across the international left will help us manage 
dangers and seize opportunities. Labour’s rapid membership growth and 
leaps forward in communication and organising can aid activists overseas 
and other parties will have similar lessons to teach. Those who have had 
engineered grassroots fightbacks against the far-right, and those who have 
opposed austerity in government spring to mind. Gains made by left parties 
in opposition in collaboration with civil society – e.g. reversing Windrush 
deportations – should also be preserved in our collective memory. Trade 
unions can and do grow stronger by sharing experience internationally. These 
bridges already exist; but they will need to be durable enough to provide moral 
and material support across borders in diﬃcult times; particularly when a 
government of the left does emerge. 
Labour has opened up a bridgehead, stands in permanent campaign mode 
and is prepared for power. It has got to this point by movement-building and 
hopes that further movement-building will sustain it. A successful movement 
harnesses its potential. It values members and develops them into organisers 
and leaders. It makes a virtue of its diﬀerences and competing perspectives. It 
listens to disillusionment and despair and translates it into hope and ambition 
for a better world – not in a distant utopia but in this electoral cycle. Socialists 
and social democrats are more than capable of building such movements and 
winning; as Labour’s leader insisted in his first conference speech, things can 
and will change.
It will be three years since the Labour Party underwent its revolution with 
the election of Jeremy Corbyn. Despite the claims for a new kind of politics 
there has been no development of a public political philosophy to match this 
transformation. The party is both utterly changed and yet also much the 
same as it was. Its lack of intellectual resources, and the absence of interest 
in thinking about Labour’s political future, suggests that this extraordinary 
period could pass away without any serious development in its ideas. 
The task of political renewal has normally fallen to the soft left. Labour 
succeeds when it builds a coalition between its thinking and creative left and 
its more pragmatic centre ground. This is not happening. The soft left is silent. 
And what now is the centre? The only intellectual innovation in the last decade 
has been the conservative socialism of Blue Labour. While it resonates out in 
the country, it is marginal within the socially liberal Labour Party. The absence 
of political renewal leaves Labour vulnerable to a revival of the Conservative 
Party. 
THE CONJUNCTURE
The first step in developing a new public political philosophy is to understand 
the times we are living in. The Italian Communist thinker Antonio Gramsci 
describes this as analysing the conjuncture, by which he means the events, 
circumstances, social forces and economic interests that structure our 
society at any given moment in its history.
10.2. The Labour Party seen
by Jonathan Rutherford
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There are debates on the left about the future of work, the dynamics of 
globalisation, the impact of mass immigration and demographic change, and 
the technological revolution of automation. But there is little discussion about 
people’s reactions to these changes. What are the leading ideas and beliefs 
that are shaping the prevailing national mood? 
Many in Labour view the mass rallies and the increase in Labour’s vote in 
the 2017 General Election as proof that progressive left values, particularly 
amongst young people, are shaping our conjuncture. The evidence however 
does not support this view. The young are no more progressive-minded than 
older generations, and they are more individualistic and acquisitive. The 
zeitgeist does not belong to the left and its socially liberal values. The energy 
disrupting the political order across Europe belongs to a populism which 
has been captured by the radical right. It has polarised societies, fractured 
the political settlement and made politics more extreme, volatile and 
unpredictable. 
The populism shaping our times is about culture. Conflict around cultural 
identity and values sharply divides the public and the elites. There is a popular 
rejection of the governing class which has presided over four decades of liberal 
market globalisation. The loss of decent jobs, cuts in public spending and the 
stagnation of wages is a significant cause of people’s feelings of powerlessness 
and insecurity. But the protest is not principally driven by economic injustice. 
It is a demand for limits on uncontrolled and uninvited demographic and 
economic change. 
Populism has erupted in defence of the sovereignty of the nation state, and its 
borders both real and symbolic. Its motivating energy is the need to redeem 
a sense of cultural identity and a way of life that feels under threat. The 
country no longer resembles who ‘we’ are. Who or what defines who becomes 
a member of a national community? At stake is the integrity of borders, not 
just national but also the boundaries defining human nature, family, and the 
inherited culture and values of the social order. 
Populism is not intrinsically either left or right. It can be both radical and 
conservative. But national and cultural anxieties have been harnessed by a 
new generation of radical right leaders: Viktor Orbán in Hungary; Marine Le 
Pen in France; Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands; Jarosław 
Kaczyński in Poland; Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria, and now Matteo 
Salvini’s nationalist populist party Lega in Italy. They have magnified conflict 
with their own and with EU elites by focusing on European voters biggest 
concerns of Muslim immigration and Islamist terrorism.
A left populism around economic injustice and democratic reform has been 
more limited and partial in its influence. Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece 
combine popular and nationalist aspirations. Beppe Grillo’s 5 Star Movement 
is an ambiguous combination of leftism and radical right that has found appeal 
amongst the unemployed. And in Britain, where ethnic allegiances are less 
pronounced, Corbyn’s brand of leftist populism has found strong support 
amongst the professional middle classes and in the metropolitan, multi-ethnic 
cities.
The rise of populism is inextricably bound up with the failures of liberal 
democracy and its counterpoint – social democracy. In France, the Czech 
Republic and the Netherlands, support for social democratic parties has fallen 
to single figures. In Germany the SPD following its lowest vote since 1933 has 
collapsed in the polls and even been overtaken by the radical right Alternative 
for Germany. And where Social Democrats have not collapsed, they have 
moved to incorporate some of the language and policies of right wing 
populism. In Britain, Corbyn’s leftist populism has bucked the trend in centre-
left decline. Brexit has, temporarily at least, quietened the populist mood.
LABOUR’S RESPONSE
Within Labour there have been broadly two responses to populism. The first 
has been reactionary and unthinkingly condemns populism. It has reduced 
Leave voters to an undiﬀerentiated group of xenophobes and closed-minded 
authoritarians. The growth of an English identity is seen as threatening and 
to be rejected. The causes of populism are explained as the dysfunctional 
psychological reaction of individuals to social change. Its supporters are either 
victims or losers who can be pitied but not liked. Some are malign and so to be 
condemned. Others are simply ignorant of their own real interests or adhere 
to the nostalgic fantasy of a lost way of life. They are not credited with one 
single positive factor or political virtue.
This response reproduces the long-standing class condescension of the 
liberal intelligentsia. It allows it to avoid the ways its sense of superiority and 
indiﬀerence to popular concerns have contributed to the growth of populism. 
The second response is progressive. It sidesteps questions of identity, 
national culture and belonging. It calls for opening up the political system to 
more participation and more democracy. People have lost agency. They feel 
marginalised and silenced. They want more control and we will give it to them. 
However the belief that the response to populism is to oﬀer more democratic 
deliberation and participation is an argument to win over the progressive 
supporters of the Liberal-Democrats and the Greens or those involved in the 
social movements. It does not resonate with the wider national populist mood. 
Rejection of the elites is not a desire for no elites but for government to be 
eﬀective, and for politicians who know who ‘we’ are and who share ‘our’ values. 
It wants more, better leadership, not less. These responses were already 
defined in Labour’s politics before the rise of left populism under Jeremy 
Corbyn, but they have since become more entrenched. 
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POPULISM
When a political order is distrustful of popular sovereignty, or when its party 
system is breaking apart, or when there is a chronic imbalance of power, it will 
become vulnerable to populism. The political scientist Cas Mudde describes 
populism as the rebellion of the silent majority: an “illiberal democratic 
response to undemocratic liberalism”. The social theorist Christopher Lasch 
called it “the authentic voice of democracy”. 
The philosopher Ernesto Laclau oﬀers the most productive definition. 
Populism is the continuity of popular traditions of ordinary people against 
the powerful. These traditions are the residue of “irreducible historical 
experience” and so they are longer lasting than class ideologies. Because they 
are more durable, traditions of popular protest provide the initial challenge to 
the status quo and the first step in asserting a new hegemony. 
Laclau follows the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci in his understanding of how 
a party gains national leadership. It must first achieve an emotional connection 
with the everyday life of the people. Populism is not a defined ideology. It might 
best be described as pre-political because it expresses the conflicts in cultural 
and economic relations that precede political change. It gives voice to the 
popular emotions generated by these conflicts and constructs them into a 
collective experience of ‘us’ against ‘them’. 
Populism gives political representation to what has been excluded from the 
democratic process. It is both a necessity for democracy and a threat to 
it. Its turbulence is a powerful disruptive force. It asks questions that have 
been avoided, but it does not provide answers. Contradictions are exposed, 
inherited political loyalties abandoned, and authority discredited. Emotional 
reaction overrides reasoned debate. The intellectuals, politicians and activists 
of the existing political order are disorientated and its most accomplished 
practitioners become marginalised. The political extremes come to dominate, 
and the conspiracy theorists, cultists and haters find a public voice.  
Those who defend the status quo with rational argument find themselves lost 
for words. They believe that language represents reality rather than defining 
it. To recover order amidst the fake news, the hostility, the pejorative name-
calling and the histrionic outbursts they try communicating better, arguing 
rationally, setting out the evidence to prove their point of view. But the old 
political vocabularies are becoming redundant. They are losing energy and 
meaningfulness. Diﬀerent ways of seeing, speaking and arguing are emerging 
and generating new energy and interest. To defend the old order is to find 
oneself excluded and left behind. 
An interesting politics, says the philosopher Richard Rorty, is a contest 
between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a 
half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things. The chief 
instrument of cultural change, he argues, is the talent for speaking diﬀerently, 
rather than speaking well. The historian Michael Kazin argues that the populist 
tradition oﬀers an insight of great democratic and moral significance – “we 
should not speak solely within the terms of populism, but without it, we are 
lost”. The Dutch Labour thinker Rene Cuperos agrees that social democracy 
“should dare to be more populist”. The political theorist Chantal Mouﬀe is 
more forthright: “we urgently need to promote a left-populism”. 
A LABOUR POPULISM
By 2010 the Labour Party had lost its way in a managerial politics that relied 
on the administrative state as its instrument of reform. Social justice was 
measured by delivery performance and targets. Labour communicated its 
politics in technocratic arguments and a jaded, sterile language. Electoral 
strategy was reduced to targeting retail oﬀers at segments of the electorate. 
The party appeared to have neither moral nor political purpose. Most 
problematic of all, it did not recognise its own torpor and disconnection from 
the electorate.
Labour had become emptied of thinking. It was frightened oﬀ by visceral 
feelings of pain, rage and despair. Anger and grief over immigration and 
culture identity were avoided by changing the subject. Its loss of authenticity 
echoed the failure of social democratic politics across Europe. And so the 
party hierarchy presided over the leaching away of its working class vote and 
then failed to anticipate the surge of populist enthusiasm that swept Jeremy 
Corbyn into the leadership. 
Corbyn’s leftist populism has revived the Labour Party with its energy and 
the enthusiasm of tens of thousands of new members. But its reach into the 
country is limited. The hard left is in control, and like its mirror image on 
the right, it has no interest in political renewal, only in the pursuit of its own 
power. Networks of innovation and new thinking are kept at arms-length by 
the party machine. And its rejection of the national in its politics leaves it 
suﬀering what Gramsci calls “blind passion and sectarianism”. 
Populism has been a reaction to globalisation and it has returned us to 
fundamental questions about the nation, ethnic diﬀerence, culture, the idea of 
humanity, and the ways people live together. It has been an emotive defence 
of local cultures and the normative values of society, driven by a fear that 
‘we’ are coming apart. The radical right has been adept at shaping it around 
an exclusionary interpretation of Western Christian civilisation. Its anti-
Islamism and pursuit of a white identity politics defines membership of the 
nation by ethnicity. National traditions are unchanging and to be defended. 
Immigration undermines the history and meaning of the nation and its people. 
Multiculturalism is merely incompatible ethnic diﬀerences living alongside one 
another in a parallel and conflictual existence. 
Labour’s leftist populism is bereft in the face of these arguments. It counters 
them with pejorative name-calling. It asserts the primacy of the economic. 
WHAT’S LEFT?100 THE UK 101
It dismisses the values of Western civilisation as imperialist. But it has no 
viable alternative story of nationhood and common national life. It dismisses 
the idea of membership of the nation, or that it has to be earned. Belonging 
to a country is no more than a simple contract. It concentrates on universal 
individual rights in a way that denies people’s need to have a sense of belonging 
to a place and a country. It embraces a libertarian identity politics whose 
repudiation of existing forms of social life oﬀers nothing in their place but a 
balkanising of society. 
Labour’s leftist populism lacks the intellectual resources to meet the 
challenge of the right. It lacks a democratic politics that can build bridges 
to diﬀerent cultures and interest groups. Its cosmopolitanism and moral 
relativism cedes the nation and the issues of culture, identity and belonging 
to the radical right. Neither its focus on economic injustice nor its support for 
devolving power and participatory democracy are suﬃcient to build a national 
popular coalition. 
POLITICAL RENEWAL
For its political renewal Labour needs to broaden its populism to include the 
national and define who ‘we’ are as a country. Citizenship of a sovereign nation 
matters more than an abstract universal right to belong to humanity. The 
right of human beings to life survives only so long as there exists a political 
community willing and able to guarantee it. And such a political community can 
only exist when people have a reciprocal obligation toward it. The democratic 
nation state under the rule of law remains the best guardian of humanity. 
Large-scale immigration has been a profound challenge to this conception of 
the nation state. National sovereignty is dependent upon a country’s ability 
to determine its internal membership, and immigration raises the question of 
how membership is to be decided and on what terms. How should a political 
community resolve the prior claim to resources of those already settled? 
The left has ignored these questions as illegitimate and so has allowed public 
debate to be dominated by futile arguments over reducing numbers and 
meeting fantasy targets. The result has been an immigration system that 
causes injustice and bureaucratic cruelty, and a sense of national identity 
and belonging thrown into uncertainty by a laissez-faire approach to social 
integration.
The fair and just basis for membership of a multi-ethnic country is reciprocity. 
The obligation of newcomers is the contribution of their work, the payment 
of taxes and the ability to participate in the life of the country through 
acceptance of its laws and speaking the English language. In return the 
national community aﬀords them protection, support, and equal rights and 
opportunities. This give and take is fundamental to a sense of justice, equality 
and self-respect. It is the glue of social cohesion and provides a social basis 
over the longer term for the evolution of a shared common culture and sense 
of belonging.
Populism today has two demands: one for cultural security and the other for 
economic security. The first is for a restoration of the mutual obligations that 
bind people into a common life and a shared national cultural inheritance. The 
second is the reestablishment of a national covenant which aﬀords citizens a 
fair wage for work done, social protection and a future of prosperity for their 
children. Labour’s leftist populism rejects the former and lacks a political 
economy for the latter. Social democracy and its New Labour variant have 
been left redundant by their failure to defend the labour interest against 
the power of capital. Liberalism with its individualism and lack of a pro-social 
politics does not have the political means of nation building. Labour needs a 
new political identity and public political philosophy. 
A Labour populism will be radical, rebuilding the everyday economy of work 
and wages, supporting family life and spreading capital, power and opportunity 
to the local across the country. Every citizen is guaranteed a universal 
basic infrastructure to facilitate a more connected society. It will also be 
conservative in standing for reciprocity in social life, valuing our inherited 
national culture and renewing the institutions of civic life and society that 
bring people together in fraternity. And it will be liberal in its pluralism, its 
valuing and toleration of cultural and religious diﬀerence, and its commitment 
to deepening and strengthening our democracy.
When the tide of populism recedes there will be no picking up where we left oﬀ. 
Populism has broken the rules. The response is not to try and re-impose the 
old ones, but to invent a new political language out of the disruptive, emotional 
power of populism and in so doing profoundly change the political settlement.
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